Choice of contract maturity with applications to international and mortgage lending by Touna Mama, Albert Le Grand
 
Direction des bibliothèques 
 
 
 
AVIS 
 
Ce document a été numérisé par la Division de la gestion des documents et 
des archives de l’Université de Montréal. 
 
L’auteur a autorisé l’Université de Montréal à reproduire et diffuser, en totalité 
ou en partie, par quelque moyen que ce soit et sur quelque support que ce 
soit, et exclusivement à des fins non lucratives d’enseignement et de 
recherche, des copies de ce mémoire ou de cette thèse.  
 
L’auteur et les coauteurs le cas échéant conservent la propriété du droit 
d’auteur et des droits moraux qui protègent ce document. Ni la thèse ou le 
mémoire, ni des extraits substantiels de ce document, ne doivent être 
imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans l’autorisation de l’auteur.  
 
Afin de se conformer à la Loi canadienne sur la protection des 
renseignements personnels, quelques formulaires secondaires, coordonnées 
ou signatures intégrées au texte ont pu être enlevés de ce document. Bien 
que cela ait pu affecter la pagination, il n’y a aucun contenu manquant. 
 
NOTICE 
 
This document was digitized by the Records Management & Archives 
Division of Université de Montréal. 
 
The author of this thesis or dissertation has granted a nonexclusive license 
allowing Université de Montréal to reproduce and publish the document, in 
part or in whole, and in any format, solely for noncommercial educational and 
research purposes. 
 
The author and co-authors if applicable retain copyright ownership and moral 
rights in this document. Neither the whole thesis or dissertation, nor 
substantial extracts from it, may be printed or otherwise reproduced without 
the author’s permission. 
 
In compliance with the Canadian Privacy Act some supporting forms, contact 
information or signatures may have been removed from the document. While 
this may affect the document page count, it does not represent any loss of 
content from the document.  
 
 
 
Université de Montréal 
Choice of Contract Maturity with Applications to 
International and Mortgage Lending 
par 
Albert Le Grand Touna Marna 
Département de sciences économiques 
Faculté des arts et sciences 
Thèse présentée à la Faculté des études supérieures 
en vue de l'obtention du grade de Philosophire Doctor (Ph.D.) 
en sciences économiques 
Décembre, 2008 
@Albert Le Grand Touna Marna, 2008. 
05 FEV.2009 
Université de Montréal 
Faculté des études supérieures 
Cette thèse intitulée : 
Choice of Contract Maturity with Applications to 
International and Mortgage Lending 
présentée par : 
Albert Le Grand Touna Mama 
a été évaluée par un jury composé des personnes suivantes : 
Alessandro Riboni, président-rapporteur 
Rui Castro, directeur de recherche 
Michel Poitevin, co-directeur de recherche 
Bari§ Kaymak, membre du jury 
Christian Sigouin, examinateur externe 
, représentant du doyen de la FAS 
Thèse acceptée le 15 Décembre 2008 
Résumé 
Cette thèse contribue à la littérature sur la durée des contrats en identifiant les bénéfices et les 
coûts de l'engagement de long terme dans le cas des contrats de dette internationale, et dans le cas 
des contrats d'emprunt hypothécaire; notamment du point de vue de l'agent. Plus précisément, je 
caractérise et compare deux structures alternatives de contrats de dette qui diffèrent uniquement par 
l'ajustement qu'elles prévoient face à un changement exogène du taux d'intérêt futur. D'une part, un 
contrat de long terme qui ne prévoit aucun ajustement des remboursements au taux d'intérêt réalisé, 
et de ce fait constitue un instrument sans risque pour l'emprunteur. D'autre part, un contrat de court 
terme qui prévoit un ajustement complet des remboursements, et de ce fait constitue un instrument 
risqué pour l'emprunteur. Intuitivement, le choix de s'engager à long terme est semblable au choix 
entre un actif à rendement sans risque et un actif à rendement risqué. Les facteurs importants qui 
déterminent la durée du contrat sont le degré d'aversion pour le risque et le profil de revenu de 
l'emprunteur . 
Dans le chapitre 1, mon modèle de choix de la durée des contrats permet d'expliquer le recours 
aux contrats d'hypothèque à taux flexible par des agents averses au risque. Ma contribution, à la 
littérature sur le choix de contrats d'hypothèque, est de montrer que les contrats d'hypothèque à 
taux variable permettent aux agents de s'auto assurer contre le risque de taux, en ajustant leurs 
paiements en conséquence. Sous certaines conditions, renoncer à l'assurance d'un contrat d'hypo-
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thèque à taux fixe est optimal. Dans le chapitre 2, j'estime une forme réduite du modèle de choix 
de contrats d'hypothèque, basée sur les résultats du chapitre 1. Je compare mes estimations aux 
résultats présents dans la littérature empirique. La contribution de ce chapitre est de mettre à profit 
une nouvelle base de données pour étudier le choix de contrats d'hypothèque. Dans le chapitre 3, 
mon modèle de choix de la durée des contrats permet d'expliquer le recours excessif, dans les années 
1990, à la dette extérieure de court terme par les pays émergents. Ma contribution, à la littérature 
sur les mouvements de capitaux internationaux, est de montrer que la dette de long terme et la dette 
de court terme sont des substituts imparfaits. Toute politique visant la réduction de l'endettement 
à court terme devrait proposer des instruments alternatifs. 
Mots-clés: Hypothèque à taux fixe, Hypothèque à taux variable, Crise asiatique, Dette extérieure 
à court terme, Epargne de précaution, Flexibilité, Auto assurance, Durée du contrat. 
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Abstract 
This dissertation contributes to the literature of contract length by identifying benefits and costs 
of long-term commitment in the case of both foreign debt contracts, and mortgage loan contracts; 
in particular from the borrower point of view. More precisely, 1 characterize and compare two 
alternatives structures of debt contracts which differ only by the extent to which they accommodate 
for an exogenous shock on the future interest-rate. On one hand, long-term contracts do not adjust 
to the realized interest-rate, so that they are risk-free for the borrower. Short-term contracts on 
the other hand, adjust the repayments to the realized rate of interest. Therefore, they are risky for 
the borrower. Intuitively, the choice of long-term commit ment is similar to the choice between a 
risky asset and a risk-free asset. The key factors that govern this choice are both the degree of risk 
aversion, and the income profile of the borrower. 
ln the first chapter, my model of maturity choice helps explain why risk-averse borrowers choose 
adjustable-rate mortgage contracts. My contribution, specifically to the literature on mortgage 
choice, is to prove that adjustable-rate mortgage loans allow for self-insurance against the interest-
rate risk, by adjusting repayments consequently. Under sorne conditions, it becomes optimal to 
renounce to the insurance attached to fixed-rate mortgage loans. In the second chapter, 1 run an 
estimation of a reduce-form equation, based on Chapter l's findings. Then, 1 compare the estimates 
with the corresponding empirical literature. The novelty in this chapter cornes from using a new 
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database on mortgage indebtedness. In the third chapter, my model of maturity choice helps ex-
plain the surge in short-term foreign borrowing by Emerging countries prior to the Asian crisis. My 
contribution, specifically to the literature on international capital flows, is to prove that long-term 
and short-term debt instruments are imperfect substitutes. Henee, any policy aiming at discoura-
ging short-term indebtedness should propose alternatives instruments. 
Key words: Fixed-rate mortgage, Adjustable-rate mortgage, Asian crisis, Maturity mismatch, 
Precautionary saving, Flexibility, Self-insuranee, Contract length. 
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Introduction 
Dans plusieurs situations réelles pour lesquelles une analyse de type principal-agent semble 
adaptée, la durée est un paramètre dé d'un contrat entre parties. L'intérêt pour la durée des 
contrats découle du tait qu'elle puisse être différente de la durée de la relation entre les parties. 
Sur le marché du travail, par exemple, un employeur et un employé d'une industrie saisonnière 
signent généralement un contrat à durée déterminée mais qu'ils renouvellent chaque saison. Il en 
va de même pour certains contrats de dette sur les marchés des capitaux. Afin de rembourser un 
emprunt lié à l'achat d'une maison, une banque et un ménage peuvent signer plusieurs contrats 
d'emprunt, successifs, de durée unitaire inférieure à la durée de l'amortissement. D'un point de vue 
aussi bien normatif que positif, il est important de comprendre dans quelle mesure la durée d'un 
contrat devrait dépendre des facteurs environnants. 
En l'absence de toutes frictions dans l'économie, des parties entrant dans une relation de plusieurs 
périodes devraient signer un contrat de long terme couvrant toute la durée de leur relation, et 
prenant en compte toutes les contingences possibles liées à la relation. Il en découle que, expliquer 
la durée des contrats reviendrait à expliquer les bénéfices et les coûts associés à l'engagement de long 
terme. En pratique, par exemple, l'absence de contrats complets serait due au coût prohibitif de la 
spécification et de l'application de toutes les contingences possibles (Williamson (1985)). Les études 
sur les contrats complets ont essayé de répondre principalement aux deux questions suivantes: quelle 
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est la durée optimale d'un contrat? Et, sous quelles conditions une succession de contrats de court 
terme est aussi efficiente qu'un contrat de long terme? 
Premièrement, les recherches sur la durée optimale d'un contrat concluent qu'elle dépend du 
degré d'incertitude qui affecte les parties, indépendamment du fait que cette incertitude soit exogène 
ou non, idiosyncrasique ou non. Parmi les pionniers de cette littérature, Gray (1978) a montré que la 
durée optimale d'un contrat est négativement reliée au niveau d'incertitude. Dans le modèle de Gray, 
la durée optimale est telle qu'elle minimise le coût total moyen de contracter (coût de transaction) 
sur la période du contrat. Un contrat de long terme possède l'avantage d'amortir sur une période 
plus longue les coûts fixes liés à la négociation du contrat. Tandis qu'un contrat de court terme, 
réduit les coûts liés à l'incertitude. En effet, Gray suppose que le degré d'incertitude augmente dans 
le temps. D'autres études ont nuancé la conclusion de Gray (1978). Harris et Holmstr6m (1987) ont 
montré que si les coûts de transactions augmentent avec le niveau d'incertitude, alors il est possible 
que la durée optimale du contrat augmente aussi avec le niveau d'incertitude. Dans le modèle de 
Harris et Holmstr6m, le coût est lié à l'acquisition de l'information sur l'unique variable d'état 
du système (et du contrat). Le choix d'acquérir de l'information s'apparente à réduire la durée 
du contrat. Aussi, lorsque le niveau d'incertitude augmente l'information se détériore, mais plus 
rapidement que l'augmentation du niveau d'incertitude. Au delà d'un certain seuil les pertes liées 
à la non-acquisition de l'information deviennent supérieures au coût de son acquisition. Enfin, Dye 
(1985) a montré que la durée optimale d'un contrat varie dans le temps, et sous certaines conditions 
est indépendante du niveau d'incertitude. 
Deuxièmement, une succession de contrats de court terme est aussi efficiente qu'un contrat 
de long terme lorsque trois conditions sont réunies. Selon la première condition, l'agent n'a pas 
accès aux marchés des capitaux tandis que le principal y a un accès illimité. Selon la deuxième 
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condition, aux dates de renégociation, l'information nécessaire pour identifier toutes contingences 
pertinentes est connaissance commune. Et enfin selon la troisième condition, le principal et l'agent 
maximisent des objectifs conflictuels, de sorte que la frontière de Pareto soit décroissante. Sous 
ces conditions, Malcomson et Spinnewyn (1988) et Rey et Salanié (1990) ont montré que le lissage 
optimal de la consommation peut être atteint indépendamment du type de contrats. Fudenberg, 
Holmstrom et Milgrom (1990) arrivent au même résultat en supposant que l'agent possède un accès 
illimité aux capitaux au même taux d'intérêt que le principal, pourvu que les parties possèdent la 
même information aux dates de renégociation. Pour éliminer l'information asymétrique découlant 
de l'accès de l'agent aux marchés des capitaux, il suffit par exemple que la fonction d'utilité de ce 
dernier exclue les effets de richesse. 
Cette thèse contribue à la littérature sur la durée des contrats en identifiant les bénéfices et les 
coûts de l'engagement de long terme dans le cas des contrats de dette internationale, et dans le cas 
des contrats d'emprunt hypothécaire; notamment du point de vue de l'agent. Plus précisément, je 
caractérise et compare deux structures alternatives de contrats de dette qui diffèrent uniquement par 
l'ajustement qu'elles prévoient face à un changement exogène du taux d'intérêt futur. D'une part, 
un contrat de long terme qui ne prévoit aucun ajustement des remboursements au taux d'intérêt 
réalisé, et de ce fait constitue un instrument sans risque pour l'agent. l D'autre part, un contrat 
de court terme qui prévoit un ajustement complet des remboursements, et de ce fait constitue 
un instrument risqué pour l'agent. Implicitement, la durée des contrats est supposée exogène, et 
négativement corrélée au niveau d'incertitude compris dans le contrat. En l'absence d'incertitude 
dans l'économie, il est équivalent de signer un contrat de long terme ou une succession de contrats 
de court terme.2 
1 Je suppose que le principal absorbe tout le risque. 
2Lorsque la variance du taux d'intérêt futur est nulle. 
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Dans le cas plus général où l'incertitude est présente, le choix de s'engager ou non à long terme 
est semblable au choix entre un actif à rendement sans risque et un actif à rendement risqué. Ainsi, 
les facteurs importants qui déterminent le choix d'un contrat sont le degré d'aversion pour le risque 
et le profil de revenu de l'agent. Je montre, par exemple, que les bénéfices de l'engagement à long 
terme augmentent avec le degré d'aversion au risque. Intuitivement, plus un agent est averse au 
risque plus il bénéficie de l'assurance du contrat de long terme, toutes choses égales par ailleurs. 
Tandis que les coûts de l'engagement à long terme augmentent avec le niveau de revenus accumulés 
avant l'occurrence du choc sur le taux d'intérêt. Intuitivement, plus un agent est riche plus il est 
capable de s'auto assurer, toutes choses égales par ailleurs. 
Dans le chapitre 1, mon modèle de choix de la durée des contrats permet d'expliquer le recours 
aux contrats d'hypothèque à taux flexible par des agents averses au risque. Ma contribution, à la 
littérature sur le choix de contrats d'hypothèque, est de montrer que les contrats d'hypothèque 
à taux variable permettent aux agents de s'auto assurer contre le risque de taux, en ajustant 
leurs paiements en conséquence. Sous certaines conditions, renoncer à l'assurance d'un contrat 
d'hypothèque à taux fixe est optimal. Dans le chapitre 2, j'estime une forme réduite du modèle de 
choix de contrats d'hypothèque, basée sur les résultats du chapitre 1. Je compare mes estimations 
aux résultats présents dans la littérature empirique. La contribution de ce chapitre est de mettre à 
profit une nouvelle base de données pour étudier le choix de contrats d'hypothèque. Mes estimations 
permettent de conclure que le degré d'aversion au risque et le niveau de richesse du ménage sont 
des facteurs importants du choix de contrats d'hypothèque. Dans le chapitre 3, mon modèle de 
choix de la durée des contrats permet d'expliquer le recours excessif, dans les années 1990, à la 
dette extérieure de court terme par les pays émergents. Ma contribution, à la littérature sur les 
mouvements de capitaux internationaux, est de montrer que la dette de long terme et la dette de 
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court terme sont des substituts imparfaits. Toute politique visant la réduction de l'endettement à 
court terme devrait proposer des instruments alternatifs. 
fi 
Chapitre 1 
Housel10lds' choice between fixed- and 
adjustable-rate n10rtgages : On the value 
of flexibility in contracting 
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1.1 Introduction 
Mortgage choice is an important decision that many households make at least once in their 
lifetime. Because of the many dimensions in which mortgage loans can differ (caps, margins, pre-
payment, points, refinancing charges, ... ), such a choice is very complex one. At the very least howe-
ver, practitioners and economists classify mort gages between fixed-rate (FRM) and adjustable-rate 
(ARM), that is according to their adjustability to interest-rate changes. Under an FRM contract, 
the coupon rate is fixed once-and-for-all at the time the contract is signed. Under an ARM on the 
other hand, the coupon rate is adjusted to a given index at pre-specified intervals. As a result, 
FRM contracts insulate borrowers against interest-rate risk, so that uncertainty is borne entirely 
by the lender. On the contrary, ARM contracts reflect the risk of rising interest-rates to borrowers. 
We are concerned with how households' idiosyncrasies influence their mort gage choice along this 
classification. Beyond the intuitive role of risk aversion as favoring FRM contracts (see for instance 
Capozza and Gau (1983)), the theoreticalliterature has yet to explain how a risk-averse borrower 
can benefit from interest-rate risk in the first place. 
ln this paper, we investigate the idea that the flexibility that cornes with an ARM contract 
should promote such risk taking. Indeed, peculiar to the mortgage choice is the fact that interest-
rate uncertainty gets resolved before the mortgage contract cornes to an end. Thus, the borrower is 
able to self-insure by spreading this risk over the subsequent periods that follow resolution. It can 
be accomplished by setting the remaining payments so as to reduce the overall exposure to risk; 
something possible under an ARM contract as payments are contingent to interest-rate realizations. 
This in turn should incite risk-averse individuals to bear risk, provided that they are better-off than 
under an FRM contract.1 
lIn this respect, the mort gage choice is an illustration that the optimal attitude toward risk and the way this risk 
will be allocated cannot be dissociated (see Gollier (2002)). 
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We opt for a three-period model, where a risk averse household must finance the purchase of 
a house from a deterministic income stream. The future interest rate is uncertain and the only 
means to transfer resources over time are : an adjustable-rate mortgage or a fixed-rate mortgage. 
The model predicts, among other things, that : more risk averse households are more likely to select 
FRM loans over ARM loans because they tend to shy away from fluctuating consumption paths 
as those implied by the repayment schedules of ARM loans. Moreover, for households with similar 
wealth, those with a faster income growth are more likely to choose FRM loans because a higher 
share of their discounted lifetime income is subject to uncertainty. Finally, households which are 
sufficiently rich prior to the interest-rate adjustment, are more likely to select adjustable-rate loans 
over fixed-rate loans. In fact, they enjoy similar advantages as investing in a risky asset while being 
able to self-insure against interest-rates increases. 
The rest of the paper is organized as foHows. Section 2 presents the environment. Section 3 
displays the mechanisms between the mortgage choice. Section 4 presents the self-insurance effect. 
In section 5, we consider the case of CRRA utility function. In section 6, we conduct an empirical 
investigation of the model implications. Conclusions are presented in section 7. 
1.2 Summary of previous research 
Few papers theoretically discuss the choice between adjustable-rate and fixed-rate mortgages, 
let alone provide a rationale for choosing ARM loans. Capone and Cunningham (1992) sketch the 
importance of risk aversion and holding periods. However, their analysis ignores self-insurance as 
they find no rationale for risk-averse borrowers to hold ARMs, when FRMs with the same holding 
period are available. Baesel and Biger (1980) and Statman (1982) focus on inflation and labor 
income. AH these papers approach the demand for mort gage in the specific case where a borrower 
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maximizes the expected utility of its lifetime wealth at retirement, with no intermediary consumption 
on which to spread interest-rate risk.2 However, it shotild only be under restrictive circumstances 
that the repayment schedule (and de facto mortgage demand) is unrelated to a borrower's lifetime 
consumption profile.3 The reason is that the typical household portfolio is quite undiversified. A 
mortgage loan is usually its major liability (see Guiso et al. (2001)) which, in addition, is carried 
over a long portion of its lifetime.4 A notable exception to this special case, however, has been 
Campbell and Cocco (2003). 
Campbell and Cocco numerically solve a life-cycle model and assume a constant relative risk 
aversion utility (CRRA). They find that households with smaller houses relative to income, more 
stable in come and lower risk aversion should find ARMs most attractive. AU this is consistent with 
our theoretical analysis based on a CRRA utility function (section 6). But Campbell and Cocco 
(2003) make no mention of the underlying assumptions, as we do in this paper. We are not aware 
of any previous work that treats early resolution of uncertainty in the mortgage choice. 
Empirical studies, on the other hand, have highlighted the central role of borrowers' risk aversion 
in the mortgage choice decision. Capone and Cunningham (1992) find that, for any given holding 
period, borrowers who choose ARM contracts have lower degrees of risk aversion. In Sa-Aadu and 
Sirmans (1995), this role shows up through a life-cycle effect, as younger households appear more 
sensitive to interest-rate changes than older borrowers.5 Using Canadian data, Breslaw, Irvine and 
2Gollier (2002) provided the theoretical foundation of allocating risk on consumption over several periods after 
uncertainty is resolved. 
3Evidence of correlations between mortgage-related features and lifetime consumption profiles can be found in 
Englehardt (1996). Using data drawn from the PSID, he find that down payment constraints affect consumption 
profiles by forcing first-time home buyers to reduce consumption when young in order to access to homeownership 
later on. 
4Canada is no exception as mortgages are the single most important debt; accounting for 75% of the overall 
value (see Statistics Canada (2005)). Guiso et al. (2001) also found that a house is usually the major asset in the 
typical household portfolio. Ironically, and contrary to the literature on the demand for mortgage, the literature on 
the demand for housing has long operated within the !ife-cycle framework (see for example Dusansky and Wilson 
(1993)). 
5 Liquidit Y constraints is a factor as weil. Since old households are less likely to face binding constraints, they can 
afford to take more risk than young households. 
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Rahman (1996) found that borrowers with family responsibilities also display relatively more aver-
sion to interest-rate risk. Campbell and Cocco (2003) examine the mortgage choice in a dynamic 
stochastic equilibrium model. They demonstrate that risk aversion is important in generating pat-
terns that are consistent with V.S. data. 
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1.3 The model 
There are two individuals, a borrower and a lender. They live for three periods. The borrower's 
consumption in period t is denoted by Ct > 0, for all t. Preferences are time-separable, and ma-
mentary utility is given by the function u which is continuous, thrice differentiable with u' > 0 and 
u" < O. We impose the Inada condition lim u' (C) = +00. For each period, the borrower earns an 
C--+O 
income Yt > 0 units of the consumption good. This income stream is nonstochastic. The borrower 
enters the first period having signed a mort gage contract for the purchase of a house worth H units 
of consumption.6 The house is to be paid in the remainder of the agent's life. Let Dt denote period 
t's repayment. 
The lender is risk neutral, it only cares about the total discounted mortgage payments and not 
about their timing. It can borrow or save unlimited amounts at the market (gross) rate of interest 
Rt, between t and t + 1; RI is fuced, but we assume that R2 is stochastic, with mean equals to 
R2 • Denote by R the long-term interest-rate (between period 1 and period 3), we assume that the 
term structure of interest rates is such that R = E(R1R2 ) = RIR2. This assumption will guarantee 
that the lender is indifferent in offering the two types of contract that we will consider, fuced-rate 
and adjustable-rate. Competition in the mortgage industry forces the lender to offer contracts that 
maximize the expected utility of the borrower, while making zera-profit. Thus, its behavior can be 
represented by an optimal borrowingjlending problem. The lender will not loan beyond what the 
borrower can repay throughout its lifetime, at the more burdensome interest-rate that is, 
where ~max is the upper bound of the admissible interest-rate in period 2. 
is equivalent to assuming that : in period 0, the house is bought, there is no consumption, the borrower's 
period-income is zero and the interest-rate Ro = 1. 
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FIG. 1.1 - Timing of the events 
We assume that the borrower has no access to credit markets. This assumption is intended to tie 
up the repayment schedule to the borrower's optimal saving path. The exclusive relationship with 
the lender may be due to the fact that once the borrower takes on a mortgage loan, subsequent 
borrowing with another lender is compromised. Indeed, given the size of a mortgage loan relative to 
income, acquiring a house moves the borrower significantly closer to a binding borrowing constraint. 
Moreover, there is no room for refinancing because the housing priee is fixed so that home equity is 
always zero at time 1, by assumption. Consequently, a mortgage contract is the only way available 
to smooth consumption over time. 
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1.4 Mortgage contracts 
In this section, we describe and give a preliminary analysis of fixed-rate and adjustable-rate. 
mortgage contract. In doing so we introduce the basic elements of the borrower-Iender relationship. 
1.4.1 Fixed-rate mort gage contracts 
A complete mortgage contract must specify the repayment schedule. Each repayment consists in 
two components: an interest-repayment on the out standing loan balance, and an "ad-hoc" repayment 
of the principal (see Appendix 1.1 for details).7 The amortization period and the term are identical 
and last three periods. Under the condition R1Y1 + Y2 ~ R1H, full payment of the mort gage loan 
prior to the maturity is prohibited We also rule out default on repayments. Mortgage contracts 
differ on whether periodic mortgage interest (plus principal) payments are fixed or adjustable with 
respect to interest rate changes. Under FRM contracts they are fixed. The key feature is that the 
interest-repayment between period 2 and period 3 is calculated with the expected interest-rate R2 . 
. An optimal FRM contract is the solution to the following maximization problem : 
subject to : Dt> 0, for t = 1,2,3, 
where f3 is the discount factor, 0 < f3 < 1. The first constraint is the period-t budget constraint. It 
states that the borrower's consumption in any period is determined by its income net of the mortgage 
7Notice that, sinee payments of the principal are endogenous the optimal mortgage payments Dt need not be 
equal for ail t. 
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repayment. The second and third constraints are imposed by the mortgage contract. The second-
constraint states that, in each period, the borrower makes a non-negative mortgage-repayment. 
Consequently, borrowing to finance current consumption is prohibited. The third constraint repre-
sents the lender's zero-profit condition. It states that the present discounted value of payments must 
equal the mortgage loan value.8 
Solving the FRM problem is pretty straightforward. We use the first constraint to substitute 
consumption in the objective function. The problem is now to find the optimal repayment schedule 
that maximizes the expected utility under the zero-profit constraint. At the optimum, the last-
repayment trivially equals the outstanding loan balance, so that we are left with an unconstrained 
maximization problem, that is : 
The first-order conditions for an interior solution are: 
(1.1) 
(1.2) 
U nder our assumptions, these conditions are sufficient as well as necessary for an optimum. Equa-
tions (1) and (2) characterize efficient intertemporal smoothing. 
For the purpose of the exposition, we will consider the following equivalent problem in the rest 
of the paper : 
8Payment Dl should not be confused with a downpayment. In fact, we assume that there is no downpayment 
requirement in the mortgage. 
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since it is deterministic, the FRM problem is trivially time-consistent, and therefore it is equivalent 
to choose D2 in period 1 or in period 2. 
1.4.2 Adjustable-rate mortgage contracts 
An adjustable-rate mortgage contract has the same components as an FRM contract, namely 
the repayment made at the start of each period to the lender. The key feature of an ARM contract 
is that the interest-payment between period 2 and period 3 is decided once uncertainty about R2 is 
resolved. Consequently, under an ARM contract a full adjustment of payments D2 and D3 is made 
at date 2. 
An optimal ARM contract is the solution to the foIlowing maximization problem : 
for every realized value of R2 
Ct = yt - Dt > 0, Dt > 0, t = 2,3, 
where E is the expectation operator with respect to the distribution of R2 . The important difference 
with the FRM problem is that aIl constraints must hold for every realization of R2 . 
To solve this problem, we foIlow similar steps as with the FRM problem, namely we replace all 
the constraints into the objective function so as to obtain an unconstrained maximization problem 
where the last-period consumption equals final wealth, that is : 
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Now, the second maximization operator is important as the subsequent mortgage payments depend 
on the ex-post interest-rate. Obviously, early resolution of uncertainty is valuable because payments 
can adjust to the new information (see Appendix A.2). We solve this problem by backward induction. 
The first-order conditions, for an interior solution, are: given a first-period repayment z, we obtain 
optimal values of D; by solving the following equation : 
U'(Y2 - D; (z)) (1.3) 
for each realization of R2. The optimal first-period repayment then follows from 
Moreover, for any two realized interest-rates m and ~ with i i= j, the following equation must 
hold 
u'(C~) 
mu'(CÜ 
u'(c4) 
R~u'(C4) (1.5) 
Equations (3) and (4) characterize efficient intertemporal smoothing just like the FRM contract. 
In addition, Eq.( 4) shows that under the ARM contract the marginal benefit of future wealth is 
uncertain, hence, Dl depends on the borrower's optimal exposure to risk as determined by R2D~ 
for all R2, where D~ = (RIDI + D2 - RIH) ~ o. Part of this exposure is implicit and positively 
related to the housing value; mechanically, RIH is a scale parameter which controls the variance 
of the random variable R2. The other part is explicit (endogenous) and controlled by the amount 
of money devoted to repayments in the first-two periods, i.e., (RIDI + D2). More specifically, once 
uncertainty is resolved, the contingent repayment D2 varies according to Eq.(5) so as to keep the 
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ratio of marginal utilities unchanged across states of the nature (Le., ex-post interest-rates). 
We can interpret Eq.(5) as a Borch rule for co-insurance between ("individuals" named) period 
2 and period 3. Thus, sharing risk in this case essentially means making a contingent "transfer" 
D2 from period 2 to period 3. If, for instance, the size of the payment D2 is bigger for high R2s, 
then R2D~ unambiguously decreases with respect to R2 (in absolute value). In this case, bigger 
transfers from period 2 to period 3 at states where the risk is high, reduce the overall exposure to 
risk. Intuitively, the borrower displays sorne selj-insurance behavior in this case. However, if the size 
of the payment D2 is lower for high R2S, then the overall exposure to risk is increased eventually. In 
this particular case, the borrower takes on added risk in order to increase its final wealth. Intuitively, 
it displays sorne gambling behavior in that he bets that high interest-rates will occur. 
In this paper, our goal is to compare W F and W A • In the absence of risk, the borrower is 
indifferent between an ARM contract and an FRM contract, Le., W A W F . Away from this trivial 
case, however, an ARM contract entails sorne risk which is absent from an FRM contract. However, 
it cornes with a larger set of strategies as the borrower can now adjust its payments to the ex-post 
interest-rate. So, it is unclear which contract is optimal ex-ante. 
1.5 Determinants of the mort gage choice 
To start, consider the second-stage problem the household faces after the renewal date, that is, 
where y~ Y2 +Rl{Z-H) and v is the indirect utility function given the first-period repayment z, 
and the rate of interest R2 (possibly equals to R2)' Notice that pA features the expected indirect 
utility, while pF features the indirect utility evaluated at the expected interest rate R2. Basically, 
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the mortgage choice is governed by the borrower's attitude towards interest-rate risk as measured 
by v's curvature with respect to R2' i.e., V22. When V22 > Othe household is thought as being prone 
to interest-rate risk. When V22 < 0, on the other hand, the household is thought as being averse to 
interest-rate risk. 
To see it, assume that V22 is uniformly negative. From Jensen's inequality we have that : 
Multiplying both sides of the inequality by (3 and adding up u(YI - z), one cibtains : 
This last inequality holds for any z, therefore it must hold when taking the maximum operator on 
both sides : 
maxu (YI - z) + (3Ev (z, R2 ) < maxu (YI - z) + (3v (z, R2 ) • 
z z 
From pA and pF, this is equivalent to 
We conclude that : 
If then 
Consequently, the household will choose the FRM contract. The opposite can be shown when 
V22 > 0, i.e., W F < W A • However, the indirect utility function vis endogenous so that a simple 
comparison between the two contracts is not always possible. 
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1.5.1 Borrower's attitude towards interest-rate risk 
In this section, we show that the household's attitude towards interest-rate risk is determined 
by the way this risk is allocated in the second-stage problem. Basically, the second-stage problem 
is a standard consumptionjsaving problem under certainty, in that given the "income" flow y~ and 
Y3, today and tomorrow, respectively, the individu al pursues intertemporal smoothing by borrowing 
D~, at the (risk-free) interest-rate R2. 
First, we present a geometric treatment. In Figures 2 and 3, we represent the budget constraint 
when the interest-rate is R2 (line Y3 K B) ; and the indifference curve (from the second-stage utility 
index) which is tangent to the segment KB. Values of v are drawn from the utility at tangency 
points (point E), for different combinat ions of z and R2 . We are concerned with the welfare effects 
of the variability of R 2. With an increase in R2, for instance, the budget constraint pivots clockwise 
around K so that today's consumption C2 falls in Figure 2. This happens for two reasons : first, in 
order to compensate for a relatively cheaper consumption in period 3, so as to keep the same welfare 
level (substitution effect); and second, because the indebted-household grows poorer (income effect). 
As for C3 , it decreases as well. Overall, a lower indifference level is attained. However, since a falling 
interest-rate brings a welfare gain, the net effect on welfare of the interest-rate risk is ambiguous. 
It depends on both the level of the outstanding debt at the beginning of the stage-2 problem and 
the curvature of the indifference curve. If the out standing debt at the beginning of the second-stage 
is low enough, then a declining interest-rate increases final wealth, i.e., C3 ; while a rising rate has 
no effect on welfare. It follows that dispersion of the interest-rate is welfare-improving provided 
the indifference curve is curvy enough around E. If such is the case at every level of R2' then the 
household unambiguously chooses the ARM contract.9 
9It should be pointed out that y; cannot be too high, in order to in sure that D3 > 0, Le., y; < C2. For c1arity 
sake, we have just considered the case y; > 0, but everything carries on with y; negative. 
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We can show, rnathernatically, that the household's attitude towards risk depends on the allo-
cation problern in stage-2. From the envelope theorern 
then, taking the derivative of V2 with respect to R2 yield 
(1.6) 
In words, V22'S sign depends on the total effect of interest-rate changes on consurnption levels C2 and 
C3. The Slutsky equation describes this total effect. Denote by ft = -u"(Ct}/u'(Ct} the degree of 
absolute risk aversion. Total differentiation of the first-order condition Eq.(3) and sorne calculations 
(see the Appendix A.4) yields 
(1. 7) 
which is negative because both the substitution effect - Le., first-terrn in the LHS of Eq.(7)- and the 
incorne effect - Le., first-terrn in the RHS of Eq.(7)- are negative. The total effect on C3 , however, 
is arnbiguous. To see it, take the first-derivative of the budget constraint with respect to R2 and 
notice that 8Dt/8R2 = -8Ct/8R2, it yields 
(1.8) 
The sign of the substitution effect on C3 is the opposite of 8C2/8R2, while the sign of the incorne 
effect is the sarne, that is, C2 and C3 are normal goods. Overall, C3 increases when the substitution 
effect dorninates the incorne effect, which in turn irnplies that the indirect utility function v is convex 
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at this specifie R2. If this is true for an realized values of R2, then the borrower always chooses 
the ARM contract. For the indirect utility function to be concave, however, it is necessary that 
8C3/8R2 be negative; that is, the income effect dominates the substitution effect on C3. 
One can show that : if the borrower does not earn enough income in the first-two periods to pay 
off its entire loan, and if its elasticity of substitution is uniformly lower than one; then 8C3/8R2 ~ 0 
everywhere (see Lemma 1, in the Appendix 1.5). 
Condition 1. R1Y1 + Y2 ~ RIH and Vt ~ 1 for ail t. 
Under Condition 1, V22'S sign is ambiguous. Hence, it guarantees that the borrower won't choose 
either ARM or FRM for all parameter values (as it would be the case if V22 < 0 or V22 > 0). It will 
de pend on the elasticity of substitution and the outstanding debt in the second-stage. lO To see it, 
rewrite Eq.(8) as follows 
(8') 
where Vt = -Ctu" (Ct) lu' (Ct) represents the inverse of the elasticity of substitution (and the degree 
of relative risk aversion). The sign of the numerator de pends on both the elasticity of substitution 
and the size of last-period repayment relative to consumption in period 2. The lower the elasticity 
of substitution, or the higher the ratio of last-period repayment to second-period consumption, the 
more likely 8CJ/8R2 is negative. Obviously, it happens away from the autarky point (see Figure 3). 
80 far, we have just considered the stage-2 problem for isolated value of R2. The design of 
payments D 2 and D3 contingent on the realized interest-rate has important implications for the 
exposure to risk under the ARM contract. The borrower displays sorne self-insurance behavior when 
the income effect dominates the substitution effect everywhere. Although, the optimal exposure to 
lONotice that Y~ is negative under Condition 1. 
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risk does not have to be zero, because renouncing to consumption in period 2 (and period 1) is costly 
in terms of marginal utility, doing so brings positive return in expectation. Under Condition 1, the 
borrower can find optimal to choose the ARM contract while at the same time insuring himself. 
However, in the limiting case where it is too costly to renounce to consumption (i.e., too costly to 
insure himself), the borrower will find optimal to choose (the full insurance of) an FRM contract.11 
On the other hand, when the substitution effect dominates the income effect everywhere, the 
borrower displays sorne gambling behavior. Choosing the ARM contract is thus unambiguously 
optimal. 12 
1.5.2 Borrower's allocation of risk over time 
In this section, we study the role of the first-period repayment in the mortgage choice. With 
a bigger first-period repayment, for instance, a lower debt burden is carried into the second-stage. 
This affects the autarky point, and thus the mortgage choice. 
In the stage-l problem, the borrower decides consumption, and savings, which proceeds become 
available for consumption in period 3. 13 However, unlike the FRM contract, first-period saving under 
the ARM contract is subject to uncertai nty. So, comparing first-period repayment under the two 
contracts is similar to asking : how, starting from a zero-risk situation, an increasing risk affects 
saving under the ARM contract. We distinguish two channels : first, increasing risk translates into a 
higher return on savings in the stage-2 problem, for each state ; second, increasing risk exogenously 
alters the exposure to risk from the standpoint of the stage-l problem. 
Let us parameterize the risk as R2 = R2 + 1]€, where € is a zero-mean random variable, 1] is 
HIf Vt is high enough. 
12The amount invested in R2 is similar to a short position in a risky asset. 
13This feature is specifie to long-term saving instruments in general, and mortgages in partieular. 
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a positive scale parameter, and the support of é is such that R2 + "lé is no less than one.14 For 
instance, R2 + "lé could describe a family of uniformly distributed random variables, all having a 
mean equals to R2' with variance parameterized by "l. The FRM problem is obtained by"l = o. A 
small increase of"l from zero, constitutes a MPS (mean preserving spread) shi ft of the distribution 
of R2. Combining Eq.(3) and Eq.(4), and differentiating it with respect to "l, we obtain : 
(1.9) 
where D is the second-or der condition of the ARM problem 
with 8C3/8"l given by Eq.(8).15 
An increased riskiness has two effects on the first-period consumption. A direct effect - i.e., 
first-term in the brackets of Eq.(9)- which follows from changing the dispersion of the return from 
saving around the mean. Since u'(C3 ) is uniformly increasing with respect to é, the sign of the direct 
effect depends solely on the sign of 8C3/8é; which is the same as 8C3/8R2'S sign. When the income 
effect dominates the substitution effect everywhere, i.e. 8C3 /& ::S; 0 for all R2' the direct effect is 
negative. In turn, first-period consumption tends to fall as the borrower needs additional resources 
in the second-stage problem for the Euler equation Eq.( 4) to hold. Graphically, if all tangency 
points lie around the autarky point, as in Figure 2, a higher dispersion moves them away from it 
by rotating the budget constraint clockwise for each initial R2. Hence, by increasing first-period 
repayment, y~ is reduced so that tangency points still lie around the autarky point. On the other 
hand, when the substitution effect dominates the income effect everywhere, i.e. 8C3/8é > 0 for all 
14Davis (1989) considered a similar parameterization. 
15The effect of risk on first-period payments follows from 8Dd8Tj = -8Cd8Tj. 
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R2' the direct effect is positive. Notice that, risk aversion alone suffices to sign this effect. 
Furthermore, an indirect effect - Le., second-term in the brackets of Eq.(9)- follows from carrying 
sorne risk. Under prudence, for instance, if it is optimal to hold a non-zero risk then individuals tend 
to increase saving in the face of uncertainty. While risk aversion defines an individual's attitude 
toward uncertainty, prudence defines how an individual reacts to it. Leland (1968) and Sandmo 
(1970) first formalized this concept and proved that a convex marginal utility, Le. ulfl > 0, is 
attached to such a prudent behavior.16 Later on, Kimball (1990) introduced the degree of absolute 
prudence, defined as <Pt -ulll(Ct)/U"(Ct ). In our setup, the analysis of the precautionary effect 
is complicated by the fact that payments adjust to the realized interest-rate. To see it, notice that 
the indirect effect is negative if the derivative of R2(8C3/8ry)UI/ (C3) with respect to e: is uniformly 
positive. The computation of that derivative yields the following expression: 
[ 8C3 R 8
2
C3] Il (C) R 8C3 8C3 f/f (C ) 
ry 8ry + 2 8ry8e: u 3 + 2 8ry 8e: u 3 
which is a weighted sum of second- and third-derivatives of the utility function. The weight on 
UIfl (C3) is positive since it has the same sign as (8C3/8R2)2. It follows that if 8C3/8ry is inde-
pendent of e: (Le., 82C3/8ry& = 0), and if the risk is small (Le., ry ~ 0), then the indirect effect is 
negative provided that prudence (i.e., <P3) is sufficiently high. In this case, the indirect effect can 
unambiguously be termed as the precautionary effect. 
When payments adjust to the realized interest-rate, however, 8C3 /Bry is no longer independent 
of e: (Le., 82C3/8ry& f:. 0). Consequently, the precautionary effect should now reftect the endo-
genous change in the exposure to risk. More specifically, a positive weight on ul/(C3 ) reduces the 
and Modigliani (1972) generalized Leland and Sandmo's results to non-additively-separable utility func-
tions. 
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precautionary effect, while a negative weight reinforces it. The quantity Ô2C 3/Ô1}Ôé measures the 
marginal change in the exposure to risk, as a result of allocating the risk between period 2 and 
period 3. Obviously, it depends on the dynamic of both substitution and income effects, but we are 
not aware of any theoretical result on this dynamic. Under Condition 1 and for a iso-elastic utility 
specification, Ô2C3/Ô1}Ôé is positive (see Appendix A.4). Intuitively, self-insurance reduces the car-
ried risk so that the precautionary effect is weakened. In general, the total effect is ambiguous. In 
the Appendix A.5, we show that for the total effect to be negative, it suffices that V122 be uniformly 
positive (see Lemma 2). 
1.6 Mortgage choice with constant relative risk aversion 
This section aims at clarifying aIl ambiguities in the model by drawing qualitative results based 
on CRRA preferences. This preference class is standard in finance and macroeconomics, and most 
importantly is consistent with realistic consumption patterns under uncertainty as opposed to say 
CARA or quadratic preferences. 17 
Consider the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function of the form : 
u(C) = (Cl-II - 1)/(1 - Il), for Il > 0, 
where Il is the degree of relative risk aversion, and Il + 1 is the degree of relative prudence. With·· 
this specification, it is readily verified that the optimal co nsum pt ion plan under the FRM contract 
can be described as follows : 
t=1,2,3, 
17In a similar three-period framework, Blundell and Stocker (1999) examine the impact of incorne risk on consump-
tion patterns, when the timing of the resolution of uncertainty varies. They conclude that "the preferences of the 
eRRA class [are] perhaps the most realistic for modelling actual saving behavior in empirical work, because they can 
capture the most plausible precautionary behavior for rich and poor households." 
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Y2 Y3 F - [- 1/ - - 1/ ] F F 1/ 
where w = Y1 + R1 + R1R2' al = (R1 R2)/ R1R2 + ({3R1) I/(R2 + ({3R2) 1/), a2 = al ({3R1) 1/ 
and a: = a; ({3R2) 1/1/. Typically, the borrower uses the FRM contract to allocate fixed shares of its 
lifetime's net wealth to consumption in each period. In fact, any change in the timing of the income 
profile that leaves the wealth level unchanged, will also leave the consumption profile unaffected. 
Under the ARM contract on the other hand, no closed-form solution is available for the entire 
consumption profile. But, we can still obtain the consumption plan of the second-stage problem, 
that is : 
t = 2,3 
net wealth is allocated to C2 and C3 , respectively. However, the timing of the income profile becomes 
relevant for the first-period consumption because it is affected by uncertainty. We will compute C: 
numerically. 
1.6.1 The effect of uncertainty 
To single out the borrower's reactions toward risk, we use as benchmark the fixed-rate mortgage 
problem when the borrower does not use the mortgage contract to smooth consumption but simply 
to access homeownership. 
In terms of parameters, it me ans setting {3R1 = {3R2 = 1 and Yt = y for all t, so that the agent 
has no incentives to borrow or save, and the consumption profile is fiat and independent of v. For 
the remainder of the section, we will use Y = 2 and {3 = 0.8 unless stated otherwise. The future 
interest-rate is assumed to be R2 = R2 + 'riE, where E is uniformly distributed over the interval 
[-€,€l and discrete on a grid of 11 points, with 10 = R2 - 1 (so that the lower bound is no less than 
one). The comparative statics experiment consists in scaling up the variance of the distribution of 
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R2 by increasing ry. We execute this experiment, numerically, for several degrees of risk aversion and 
housing values. 
From Figure 4, it appears that, in absence of risk (Le., ry = 0) the first-period shares are 
equal under the two contracts. Unlike first-period shares under the FRM contract, 0: is affected 
by both the increasing risk and the changing parameter v. 18 For low values of risk aversion, the 
borrower gambles on interest-rate, that is, the direct effect is positive. Moreover, it dominates 
the precautionary effect so that the borrower enjoys additional risk to the extent that wealth is 
sent to the risk-free period 1. In this case, first-period share increases with respect to risk, and is 
greater than its counterpart in the FRM contract everywhere. At higher degrees of risk aversion, 
the borrower eventually stops gambling and the direct effect bec ornes negative. In addition, since 
the degree of prudence is increased as well, the precautionary effect reinforces the direct effect so 
that the borrower sends much wealth into risky periods in order to insure himself. 
From Figure 5, it appears that raising the housing value H generates the same reactions towards 
risk as raising v. In fact, by increasing the overall indebtedness, a higher housing value makes 
gambling on high interest-rates less attractive, consequently the direct effect goes from being positive 
to being negative. In the meantime, a higher H increases the implicit risk exposure so as to raise the 
optimal exposure to risk and thus the precautionary effect (everything else being equal, specially 
v, ry and €'s variance). Overall, 0: is increases at first with respect to risk for low values of H, and 
then decreases for higher values. 
Based on Figures 5 and 6, we conclude that the substitution effect dominates the income effect 
for low values of H, or low values of v, while the income effect dominates the substitution effect 
for high values of H, or high values of v. 19 In Figure 6, we provide additional support about 
18The share is computed as e~ = c: j(w - H), we use it in order to eliminate level effects. 
19It has to do with the fact that the two-period utility index attached to the second-stage problem is ordinarily 
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the dynamics of both effects with respect to the housing value and the el asti city of substitution, 
respectively. Let us first set Ti = 1. We then give an illustration of each possible configuration of 03 
over the interval of R2. Panels 1 and 2 depict the cases where 803/8R2 keeps the same sign over 
the interval of R2, these cases are well understood (Panels 1 and 2 are obtained for the combination 
H = 2.9, /1 = 0.7, and H = 2.75, /1 = 1.1, respectively). Computations suggest that the total effect 
of risk on first-period consumption is dominated by the direct effect. Panels 3 and 4 depict hybrid 
cases where 803/8R2 changes sign over the interval of R2 (Panels 3 and 4 are obtained for the 
combination H = 3.2, /1 = 0.7 and H = 2.6; /1 = 1.1, respectively).2o In Panel 3,03 first increases, 
and then decreases. In Panel 4, 0 3 first decreases, and then increases. We summarizes these finding 
as follows : 
Consider a borrower with a constant degree of relative risk aversion. Then, he finds optimal to 
choose the ARM contract : (i) if he is not too averse to risk; or (ii) if the housing value is not too 
high. 
Starting from a situation where the borrower is indifferent between an ARM contract and a 
FRM contract, a borrower with a lower degree of risk aversion requires less insurance than what 
the FRM contract offers, so that he would rather self-insure and bear sorne risk in exchange for 
additional wealth. From the same initial situation, a borrower with a lower housing value faces 
less implicit risk while has more revenues early on to speculate on future interest-rates. He thus 
needs less insurance than what a FRM contract offers so that he finds optimal to choose the ARM 
contract. We illustrate Proposition 1 in Figure 7 (in Appendix A.5, we report sorne numerical result 
equivalent to a CES utility function with elasticity of substitution equal to 1/1/ (this intuition is due to Larry Epstein 
(1980)). As such, we recall that, C2 and C3 are complements when 1/ > 1, and perfect complements (Leontief) in the 
limiting case 1/ -- 00. They are substitutes, on the other hand, when 1/ < 1, and perfect substitutes in the limiting 
case 1/ -- O. In our setup, the budget constraint (income effect) makes this classification depend on other parameters 
as weil. Geometrically, it has to do with the fact that preferences of the CRRA-class are (quasi)-homothetic and that 
the curvature of the contour of a typical indifference curve is controlled by a single parameter, i.e., 1/. 
20These cases are rather scarce, for 100 combinations of H and 1/ we found just the two cases that appear in Panels 
3 and 4, respectively. 
Panell: (H,v) = (2.9,0.7) 
0,86 
0,84 
0,82 
0,8 
0,78L.--------~---'---...... 
-:", 0.7 
Q 
0.695 
0,69 
0.685 
0,68 
1 1.1 1,2 1.3 1.4 1.5 
R2 
Panel 3: (H,v) = (3.2,0.7) 
0.675'---~--~--~---'--"'" 
1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1,4 1,5 
R2 
Pane! 2: (H, v) (2.75,1.1) 
-: 0,9 
cS 
t' 
0.89 
°,86,'----, .... ,--... , -2--, .... 3---,.4--..... , 5 
R2 
Panel 4 : (H,v) = (2.6,1.1) 
0,9365 
0.936 
0.9355 
0.935 
0.9345 
°,934,'----, ... , --... ,.~2--, ... ,3---,.4--..... ,.5 
R2 
FIG. 1.6 - Last-period consumption wrt to interest-rate 
H 
o v 
FIG. 1.7 - Mortgage choice, housing value and relative risk aversion 
for difIerent housing values and degrees of relative risk aversion). 
31 
32 
1.6.2 The effect of consumption smoothing 
We now proceed to reintroduce consumption smoothing by departing from the fiat income profile 
assumption. How it affects the trade-off between mortgage contracts is summarized in the following 
proposition : 
Consider a borrower with a constant degree of relative risk aversion. Then, he finds optimal to 
choose the ARM contra ct : (i) if its income is relatively more concentrated early on in life, i.e., Y l 
or Y2 is high enough; or (ii) if income growth, i. e, Y23 is not too high. 
What matters for the trade-off between mortgage contracts is how rich the borrower is early in 
its life, i.e. how big is Y~ in Figures 2 and 3. From Figure 3, for instance, the higher Y~ is, the lower 
will be the outstanding debt when entering period 3, i.e., D3. This in tum brings closer the tangency 
points and the autarky point, and reduces welfare losses that follow from rising interest-rates. So, if 
we start from a situation where the borrower is indifferent between an ARM contract and a FRM 
contract, higher income in the first-two periods willlead the borrower to choose the ARM contract . 
. However, increasing future revenue, i.e., Y3, has the opposite effect on the mortgage trade-off. 
In fact, increasing Y3 reduces the incurred gains of a borrower who is close to the autarky point, 
or increases the incurred losses for a· borrower who is already away from the autarky point. This in 
tum, favors the FRM contract. 
1. 7 Conclusion and Empirical implications 
By choosing an adjustable-rate mort gage (ARM), households speculate on the future interest-
rate, and take a risk that is absent from a fixed-rate mort gage (FRM). In this framework, the 
following predictions can be tested empirically : first, the higher the interest-rate under an FRM 
loan, the more likely households choose ARM loans because it becomes increasingly attractive to 
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bet on a lower interest-rate in the future. Second, more risk averse households are more likely to 
select FRM loans over ARM loans because they tend to shy away from fluctuating consumption 
paths as those implied by repayments schedule under ARM loans. Third, for households with similar 
wealth, those with a faster in come growth are more likely to choose FRM loans because a higher 
share of their discounted lifetime income is then subject to uncertainty. Fourth, households with 
enough wealth are more likely to select adjustable-rate loans over fixed-rate loans because they enjoy 
similar advantages as investing in a risky asset while being able to self-insure against interest-rates 
increases. 
Contrary to the standard practice of banks to ignore the future stream of in come of the borrower 
when lending, this paper suggests that it actually matters for the mort gage choice. In practice, 
borrowers have a private information over their future incomes, hence taking them into account will 
create a moral hazard problem. An avenue for future research will be to characterize the incentive-
compatible mort gage contract that accounts when the bank account for future incomes. 
Chapitre 2 
Households' choice between fixed- and 
adjustable-rate mort gages : An 
Empirical Analysis 
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2.1 Introduction 
ln this paper, we follow the findings in Chapter 1 in order to identify the determinants of the 
mort gage choice. By choosing an adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM), households speculate on the 
future interest-rate, and take a risk that is absent from a fixed-rate mortgage (FRM). Heuristically, 
this binary choice parallels a discrete portfolio problem of choosing between a risk-free and a risky 
asset with the important feature that the borrower can self-insure against the interest-rate risk. 
We showed that : first, the higher the interest-rate under an FRM loan, the more likely households 
choose ARM loans because it becomes increasingly attractive to bet on a lower interest-rate in the 
future. Second, more risk averse households are more likely to select FRM loans over ARM loans 
because they tend to shy away from fluctuating consumption paths as those implied by repayments 
schedule under ARM loans. Third, for households with similar wealth, those with a faster income 
growth a more likely to choose FRM loans because a higher share of their discounted lifetime 
income is then subject to uncertainty. Fourth, households with enough wealth are more likely to 
select adjustable-rate loans over fixed-rate loans because they enjoy similar advantages as investing 
in a risky asset while being able to self-insure against interest-rates increases. 
The role of borrower characteristics in predicting mortgage instruments selection has generated 
numerous interests within the empirical literature. At the heart of the debate, two views have 
been considered : whether the selection is primarily motivated by aggregate factors, such as the 
affordability of the loan (Dhillon, Shilling and Sir mans (1987), Sa-Aadu and Sirmans (1995), and 
Breslaw, Irvine and Rahman (1996)), or by borrower idiosyncracies, such as the degree of risk 
aversion or the income stream (Basel and Biger (1980), and Statman (1982)). Something that has 
been lacking is an integrated theory of the mortgage choice to rely upon for the empirical work. 
This paper attempts to fill this void. 
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We take advantage of unique supplements in the 1996 survey of the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID) to address these effects. 1 Most of these variables appear in the existing literature. 
But, the difficulty in pinning down their effects on the mortgage decision is due, in part, to the 
lack of publicly available data set on mortgage loans; or alternatively to the lack of appropriate 
proxies for variables such as risk aversion.2 One convenience with using households survey data is 
that self-reported answers are available for many aspects of the household behavior.3 For instance, 
in order to palliate the absence of information on households balance sheets, we rely on an indirect 
measure to classify households according to their wealth level. Homeowners are said to have low 
level of wealth if they belong to the group of liquidity-constrained households, based on self-reported 
aspects of their credit status. Households in this group are younger, belong to larger families, earn 
lower annual incomes and own housing that worth less than their unconstrained counterpart. 
We find strong evidence that the spread between FRM and interest-rates, as well as borrowers' 
level of wealth, influence the mortgage decision. However, the motivation for more affordable loan 
seems to govern the decision because the probability to choose an adjustable-rate loan is higher for 
less liquid borrowers. We also find that risk considérations matter to the mortgage choice decision. In 
fact, households with a higher risk aversion choose the fixed-rate mortgage with a higher probability. 
Surprisingly, households that choose government insurance programs are more likely to choose FRM 
loans. Once we account for those variables, life-cycle variables have little explanatory power. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows : we summarize the relevant empirical literature 
in Section 2. We conduct a general description of the 1996 PSID, as well as the sample selec-
l Hurst and Stafford (2004) exploit this data set as weil, but their focus is not on the choice between adjustable-rate 
and fixed-rate mortgage loans. 
2For competitive reasons banks and other financial institutions refuse to disclosed data drawn from their pool of 
mortgage-applicants. 
3The caveat, compared to data sets from financial institutions, is that reported amounts are often subject to 
measurement errors, specially for the reported mort gage transactions. 
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tion in Section 3. Section 4 provides further description of the working sam pIe along the lines of 
theoretically-motivated variables. In Sections 5 and 6, we present the empirical methodology and 
the results, respectively. 
2.2 Literature reVlew 
Brueckner and Follain (1988) pioneered a methodology to estimate the role of borrowers' cha-
racteristics in the mortgage choice decision. Using a mortgage-pool data drawn from the Residential 
Mortgage Finance Database, they estimate a binomial probit to determine the role of borrower risk 
aversion, income-path, mobility as well as the level of interest rate and the mortgage affordability. 
The key in Brueckner and Follain's methodology is to predict the interest rate of rejected mortgage-
instruments, say a FRM loan for a borrower who chooses an ARM loan, by using a subsample 
of a FRM loan after correcting for selectivity bias. They found no significant evidence of the role 
of borrowers' characteristics. According to their research, only the interest-rate differential between 
FRM and ARM matters. However, except for rates of interest, Brueckner and Follain have no choice 
but to rely on rather imperfect proxies to capture borrower characteristics available in their data 
set. For instance, the "presence of children in the household" serves as an operational measure for 
the effect of risk aversion, discount rate and strength of the demand for housing. Clearly, it may 
capture effects that have nothing to do with the mortgage demand as weIl. 
Capone and Cunningham (1992) recognize that the selection of a mortgage-instrument cannot 
be separated from the likelihood to default on the loan, the idea being that borrowers make their 
mortgage decision using information about their expected mortgage tenure and their aversion to 
risk. Basically, they extend Brueckner and Follain (1988) by including indices that account for the 
mortgage termination, and they consider several proxies for risk aversion. Data for this study are 
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drawn from origination files of the North American Mortgages Corporation, and comprise only 
single-family property in Texas. They finq that : for any given tenure, borrowers who choose ARM 
contracts have lower degrees of risk aversion. The sample studied, however, belongs to a period of 
high and volatile interest rates, something they could not control for because ARM loans were not 
widely available prior to 1981. 
Sa-Aadu and Sirmans (1995) treat mort gage instruments as differentiated products along the 
degree of exposure to risk that they offer. Using the pool of borrowers from a federally chartered 
savings association, they estimate a multinomial model along the five alternative contracts. Since 
all mortgages are originated by the same institution, Sa-Aadu and Sirmans find rates of rejected 
contracts by picking rates in the sample of contracts originated at a similar date. They conclude 
that borrower characteristics influence the demand for mortgage. More specifically, they find that 
borrowers who are more mobile, young or expecting their income to rise are more likely to select 
ARM loans. Given that samples of applicants drawn from financial institutions are usually subject 
to systematic truncation, Sa-Aadu and Sirmans's matching technic leaves their estimates vulnerable 
to important selectivity bias. 
Dhillon, Sa-Aadu and Shilling (1996) extend previous studies by relying solely on commercial 
mortgages instead of residential mortgages, in order to check whether borrower characteristics mat-
ter. They reproduce Brueckner and FoUain's study on a pool of commercial mort gages originated 
by a life in surance company. They found that, contrary to individual borrowers, income stream ge-
nerated by project of commercial borrowers have little effect on their mort gage selection. However, 
Dhillon, et al. fail to address the fact that a potential effect is likely to show up between the length 
period of the mortgage and companies projects duration. In fact, as it is the case for the maturity 
choice of debt in a corporate environment, firms likely match long-term projects with long-term 
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debt, and vice versa for short-term projects. 
Few papers address this question on non-D.S. data. Breslaw, Irvine and Rahman (1996) use a 
large database of new loans compiled by the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC), 
a mortgage insurance company. To sorne extent the set of mortgage instruments in Canada is less 
complex than in the D.S., that is, being closer to a binary decision between ARM and FRM. Breslaw, 
Irvine and Rahman find no role for borrower idiosyncracies. In particular they conclude that income 
has more influence on the purchase decision th an on the type of mortgage instrument selected. But 
it seems that policy-related incentives from a clear housing policy in Canada, that include almost 
systematic resort to insurance from the CMHC, make the mortgage demand fairly homogenous. 
One example is a very low dispersion of the gross debt service to income ratio among sam pIed 
households. Leece (2000) uses the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) to study the mortgage 
choice decision. Dnlike the version of the PSID that we use in this paper, the BHPS do not asked 
surveyed households the type of mortgage instrument they carry. Leece relies on reported mortgage 
payments and interest rates to deduct whether the loan is an ARM or a FRM. Surprisingly, he finds 
no evidence of a systematic response to rates differential between fixed-rate and adjustable-rate 
mortgages. But, his study is vulnerable to important classification errors. 
2.3 Data 
2.3.1 Background on V.S. mort gage market 
The typical mortgage instrument in the D.S. is the fixed-rate mortgage (FRM) with an amortiza-
tion period of thirty years. However, a fifteen years FRM, as well as several alternative adjustable-
rate mortgages (ARMs) also exist. ARM loans started to be supplied widely after an important 
deregulation for federally chartered institutions in 1981. ARMs are differentiated by the frequency 
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of interest-rate adjustment to a pre-specified index, ranging from six months to 5 years. Four indices 
dominate the market: the one year constant maturity Treasury yield, the one year LIBOR, the Ele-
venth District Cost-of-Funds Index (EDCOFI), and the Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB) 
national average contract interest rate (Stanton and Wallace (1999)). Depending on the period, the 
most popular oscillates between the l-year, the 3-year and the 5-year ARM; in 1996, for instance, 
l-year ARMs were the most prevalent (Freddie Mac (1996)). 
Since lending institutions rely on bond market to finance their mortgage loans, the spread bet-
ween FRM interest-rates and ARM interest-rates (hereafter FRM-ARM rate differential) is usually 
positive.4 ln Figure 1, we represent the monthly rates between 1984 and 1996 for the l-year ARM 
indexed to the Treasury yield and the 30-year FRM, respectively. Vnderstandably, rates increase 
with the fixity of term. For instance, in 1996 the FRM-ARM rate differential were 1.97%, 0.91% 
and 0.54%, for l-year, 3-year and 5-year ARMs, respectively, based on the l-year or 3-year constant 
maturity Treasury yield (Freddie Mac (1996)).5 
Another important aspect of the V.S. mort gage market is the mortgage-insurance system. Hou-
seholds mostly have access to three means to insure their mortgages against default risk, which is 
defined as the risk of loss that could occur if the borrower fails to make a payment on the loan 
(see Brueggeman and Fisher (2005)). The first means is the conventional insurance, it is offered 
by private insurers and which covers the lender for only a portion of the loan. Regulations require 
that all conventional mortgages with an originating down payment lower than 20% must secure 
private insurance. Hence, the interest-rate charge on this type of loan might be higher than the 
rate on uninsured conventional mortgage. The second means works through Federal Housing Admi-
nistration (FHA) insurance programs, which unlike conventional insurance fully insure the lender. 
4Except if the yield curve is inverted. 
5While the FRM rate corresponds to the average 30-year FRM commit ment rate of 7.67 percent from Freddie 
Macs Primary Mortgage Market Survey. 
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Source: Primary Mortgage Market Survey, Freddie Mac 
FIG. 2.1 - 30-year FRM vs. 1-year ARM 
This program was initially created to facilitates access to homeownership. Rowever, there is loan 
maximums on FRA insured mortgages, so that households must turn to conventional insurance to 
obtained a higher loan or to avoid making a big payment up front for down payment. The third 
mortgage-insurance is the Veteran Affairs (VA) guarantee programs which target veterans or their 
spouses. Unlike FRA programs, VA programs provide loan guarantees instead of default insurance. 
2.3.2 Description and selection 
The data for our study are based on a sample of American households extracted from the Panel 
of Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Since 1968, this database has been gathered each year by the 
Survey of Research Center of the University of Michigan. The survey contains detailed information 
on earnings, income, demographic and mortgage-related characteristics. In particular, homeowners 
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were asked to indicate the year they obtain the loan, whether it is original or refinanced, the current 
interest-rate (r), the outstanding loan balance (B), the number of years remaining on the mortgage 
(n) and the annual mortgage payment, Le. payment of interest and principal (A). For one year, and 
for only one year, questions about homeowners' choice of mortgage instrument were included in the 
annual survey. For 1996, the survey asked mortgage borrowers to indicate whether the interest rates 
on the loan were fixed or adjustable. From the initial 8,511 households in the survey, 2,837 held 
a mortgage loan. Our working sample consists on 1,792 households. Among them, a total of 1,427 
households answered "Fixed" to the question : "Is the interest rate on that loan fixed or variable 
(adjustable)?"; and 365 answered "variable". A proportion of 79.63% held a FRM contract. 
A variety of different criteria led to the exclusion of many observations in the database. First, 
we exclude data for which the mortgage instrument selected is neither an ARM nor a FRM (59 
homeowners). Second, we drop aU observations for which the mortgage were obtained prior to 1981, 
because ARM contracts were not widely offered (278 homeowners). Third, we exclude observations 
for which the current interest-rate (296 homeowners) or the year the mortgage loan were obtained 
(24 homeowners) are not reported. Fourth, we also exclude from the working sample, observations 
for which the consistency of the mortgage transaction (as defined below) could not be performed; 
mostly due to missing values for property taxes, homeowner insurance premium, outstanding loan 
balance, mortgage payment or number of years remaining on the mortgage. At this stage, we are left 
with 2074 observations. Finally, we exclude households from the analysis if the mortgage interest 
rate (rm ) implied from the recorded values of A, Band n lays outside the range 2% to 27% (as in 
Quigley (1987)), or is inconsÎstent with the recorded interest-rate r. The implied mort gage interest-
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FIG. 2.2 - Mortgage loan8 originating in the 19808 and 19908, by type (percentage) 
FIG. 2.3 - Mortgage loan8 originating in the 19908, by type (percentage) 
TAB. 2.1 - Mortgage selection for various sub-samples (total) 
ARM FRM 
Variables (1) (2) 
Al! 365 1,427 
Original 262 825 
Originated after 1995 76 308 
Original and originated after 1995 60 184 
NOTES : "Original" stands for original loan and terrns (not refinan-
ced) ; while "Originated after 1995" corresponds to mortgage loan 
originated in 1995 or in 1996. Data definitions and sources for all 
varia hies are reported in the Appendix. 
rate is defined as the value of Tm that satisfies : 
B- t A . =0.6 
i=1 (1 + Tm)' 
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We are left with 1,792 homeowners. The vast majority of these mortgage loans are meant to 
finance one-family houses (around 91%), and are worth on average $137,114. From Figures 2 and 
3, a bulk of these mortgage loans were obtained in the 1990s (1,481 loans), with the FRMs being 
consistently the dominant instruments. In columns 1 and 2 of Table 1, we also report the total 
number of observations for original mortgage loans and recent loans origination. More than half of 
the sample is composed of originalloans (1,104 observations), among which 384 were obtained after 
1995. 
We report additional description of the working sample. In Table 2, we break up the mort gage 
choice along various sociodemographic characteristics of the head of the borrowing household. The 
6The difference between the contract rate and the implied rate may come from fees and charges. We use the 
command "annurate" in Matlab to get the implied mortgage interest-rate. 
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TAS. 2.2 - Mortgage selection and sociodemographic characteristics (proportion) 
ARM FRM ARM+FRM 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Sex 
Male 20.23 79.77 87.44 
Female 21.33 78.67 12.56 
Race 
Black 17.52 82.48 17.52 
White 21.05 78.95 78.74 
Other 19.4 80.6 3.74 
Marital status 
Married 20.06 79.94 78.74 
Divorced 22.17 77.83 11.33 
Age (years old) 
less than 35 21.13 78.87 21.65 
35 to 45 20.52 79.48 42.97 
over 45 19.71 80.29 35.38 
Education (years) 
less than 13 19.13 80.87 46.37 
13 to 16 19.42 80.68 38.78 
over 16 26.69 73.31 14.84 
NOTE: Data definitions and sources for ail variables are reported in 
the Appendix. 
majority of them are male (87.44%) under 45 years old, white, married and with less than 13 years of 
schooling completed. The mortgage selection among sex groups is similar to the sample proportion; 
roughly, 20% choose ARM loans. However, a slightly bigger proportion of divorced heads chose 
adjustable-rate loans compared to both married heads and the sample average. In terms of age and 
education, it stands out that older people (over 45 years old) hold a relatively bigger proportion 
of FRMs; while the highest fraction of ARM contracts is found among the more educated heads 
(26.69%). At the other extreme, households with a black head hold the lowest fraction of adjustable-
rate loans (17.52%). 
In Table 3, we compute mean sam pIe averages along family size, age and education of the head, 
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gross income of the household, house value, outstanding debt and time at the current job. In terms 
of age, family size house value and time at the current job, the difference between mortgage types is 
not flagrant. The difference in average outstanding debt probably follows from the fact FRM loans 
have a longer term in general. However, people who seek ARM loans tend to be more educated 
(around 16 years of schooling completed) and have slightly higher earnings, a higher fraction of this 
earning cornes from financial assets (7.4%) when compared to borrowers with a fixed-rate loan.7 
A finer look is devoted to the mortgage selection within the income distribution (unweighted). We 
show the proportion of mortgage instruments by quintile of income; the cutoff levels are $37,098, 
$51,043, $66,497, $92,995, respectively. The highest fractions of ARM contracts appear in the fifth 
(22.07%) and first (21.94%) quintiles, respectively. 
In Table 4, we successively consider the sub-samples of original mortgage loans, and those ori-
ginated after 1995. Loans that have been not refinanced yet, represent 60.7% of the sample, with 
24.1 % of them being adjustable-rate mortgages. Borrowers in this sample present below-average va-
lues in all categories (column 3). Recently originated loans represent only 21.43% of the sample, with 
19.79% of them being adjustable-rate mortgages. Furthermore, except for education, out standing 
debt and fraction of income coming out of financial assets, all other variables present below-average 
values as weIl. It is not surprising that heads of those households are younger, and have spent less 
time in their current job. When the distinction between mortgage types is made, borrowers in this 
group depart from the sam pIe averages in many ways. However, they represent less than 5% of the 
working sample. 
Finally, we look at mort gage selection along the main occupation of the household's head (Table 
5). In the same table we also consider the sub-samples of original mortgage loans, and recently 
70nly 352 households earn revenues from financial assets. Part of this low number can be explained by the 
"participation puzzle", that is, the stylized fact that the vast majority of households in most countries hold only safe 
assets, despite positive excess returns expected on risky assets (Guiso et al. (2001)). 
TAB. 2.3 - Mortgage selection and sociodemographic characteristics, al! (average) 
ARM FRM ARM+FRM 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Age 42.13 42.03 42.05 
Farnily size 3.20 3.23 3.22 
Education 16.14 15.17 15.37 
Incorne 72,717.2 71,008.8 71,356.8 
frorn linancial assets (% of incorne) 7.4 3.8 4.54 
quintiles 
lowest 21.94 78.06 
second 21.0 79.0 
third 19.22 80.78 
fourth 17.6 82.4 
highest 22.07 77.93 
House value 136,852.18 137,182.06 137,114.86 
Outstanding debt 77,305.0 85,772.51 79,029.7 
Tirne in current job 10.1 10.98 10.81 
NOTES: Data definitions and sources for ail variables are reported in the Appendix. Ali dollar 
amounts are 1996 dollars. Only 352 households earn revenues from financial assets. 
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TAB. 2.4 - Mortgage selection and sociodemographic characteristics, by sub-samples 
ARM FRM ARM+FRM 
Variables ( 1) (2) (3) 
Original 24.1 75.9 60.67 
Age 40.99 39.95 40.2 
Farnily size 3.19 3.18 3.19 
Education 15.94 15.17 15.36 
Incorne 67,877.91 62,083.63 63,480.23 
frorn financial assets (% of incorne) 5.95 3.21 3.83 
House value 129,443.44 126,099.75 126,905.68 
Outstanding debt 84,525.58 74,365.75 76,814.58 
Tirne in current job 9.69 9.73 9.72 
Originated after 1995 19.79 80.21 21.43 
Age 37.01 40.35 39.69 
Farnily size 3.14 3.08 3.09 
Education 16.5 15.43 15.64 
Incorne 77,378.78 67,166.96 69,188.052 
frorn financial assets (% of incorne) 4.3 4.87 4.76 
House value 148,972.37 122,379.22 127,642.45 
Outstanding debt 111,051.57 83,229.08 88,735.61 
Tirne in current job 7.46 9.15 8.81 
NOTES: Data delinitions and sources for all variables are reported in the Appenclix. Ali dollar 
amounts are 1996 dollars. Only 352 households earn revenues from linancial assets. 
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TAB. 2.5 - Mortgage selection byoccupation (proportion) 
ARM FRM ARM+FRM 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
AlI 
Professional, Technical 20.9 79.1 23.21 
Managers and Administrators 21.07 78.93 20.93 
Sales Workers 16.67 83.33 5.4 
Clerical 23.58 76.42 6.86 
Craftsman 18.77 81.23 17.24 
Operatives and Transport 20.18 79.82 6.1 
Original 
Professional, Technical 26.9 73.1 22.91 
Managers and Administrators 25.25 74.75 18.58 
Sales Workers 21.57 78.43 4.69 
Clerical 25 75 7.36 
Craftsman 23.23 76.77 18.22 
Operatives and Transport 20.55 79.45 6.72 
Originated after 1995 
Professional, Technical 25 75 18.75 
Managers and Administrators 24 76 19.53 
Sales Workers 26.1 73.9 6.0 
Clerical 26.67 73.33 7.81 
Craftsman 16.18 83.82 17.71 
Operatives and Transport 16 84 6.5 
NOTE: Data definitions and sources for ail variables are reported in the Appendix. 
originated loans. The most represented occupations are professional and technical workers (23.21 %), 
followed by managers and administrators (20.93%), and craftsman (17.24%). In aIl three samples 
of Table 5, it appears that managers and administrators tends to have above-average fractions of 
ARMs. 
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2.4 Preliminary analysis 
In this section, we introduce the key variables that we will be using to explain the mortgage choiee 
based on the findings in the Chapter 1. We first consider the interest-rate differential between the 
two type of mortgages as proxied by the FRM-ARM rate differential. We use this measure to verify 
the conclusion that : the higher the interest-rate under an FRM loan, the more likely households 
choose ARM loans because it becomes increasingly attractive to bet on a lower interest-rate in the 
future. 
Second, we con si der the level of wealth. From the previous chapter : households with enough 
wealth are more likely to select adjustable-rate loans over fixed-rate loans because they enjoy similar 
advantages to investing in a risky asset while being able to self-in sure against interest-rate increases. 
Ideally, we would like to classify households by their level of wealth specially prior to the mortgage 
acquisition. However, the 1996 PSID does not record households' balance sheets. As an operational 
proxy we rely instead on borrower credit history. Our reasoning is that among mortgage borrowers 
in the sample, liquidity-constrained borrowers were the ones with less liquidity at the time they 
sought their mortgage loan (and even beyond), irrespect ive of the timing of the binding constraint.8 
We classify as liquidity-constrained households that confessed having had "money problems" sinee 
January 1991 (see the Appendix for details). Figure 3 displays the number of cases each year in 
the sample. They represent 27.73% of the sample, among them 95.0% confessed having ''found 
themselves unable to pay your bills when they were due" (293 households) or "obtained a loan to 
consolidate or pay off your debts" (171 households).9 
In Table 6, we compute sociodemographic characteristics of borrowers by credit status and 
mortgage selection. In line with their credit status, liquidity-constrained borrowers are younger, 
BThe constraint is probably less binding compared to the average household surveyed in the 1996 PSID. 
9Both are minor credit blunders, but they CM rightfully be identified as "default" as weil. 
51 
FIG. 2.4 - Mortgage loans for liquidity-constrained borrowers (total) 
belong to a larger family, earn a lower annual income and have a house, Le. real asset, worth less 
than the unconstrained borrowers. lO It is in line with the intuition that individuals with a high 
level of wealth have high income as weIl. On these grounds, this proxy is appropriate to recount 
borrowers with less liquidity. Contrary to what our prediction would imply, a bigger fraction of 
them hold an adjustable-rate loan compared to the group of less constrained. Obviously, we need 
to control several other variables, especially the interest-rate levels. 
Third, we consider risk aversion. More risk averse households are more likely to select FRM loans 
over AIU.1loans because they tend to shy away from fiuctuating consumption paths as those implied 
by repayment schedules under ARM loans. A singularity of the 1996 PSID is that questions about 
households' risk aversion were inc1uded in the annual survey. It asked how willing respondents are to 
lOUsing a different definition of "liquidity constrained", Jappelli (1990) arrived to a similar set of characteristics for 
liquidity-constrained households. 
TAB. 2.6 - Mortgage selection and sociodemographic characteristics, by liquidity status 
ARM FRM ARM+FRM 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
U nconstrained 18.25 81.75 72.77 
Age 43.23 42.36 42.5 
Farnily size 3.12 3.17 3.16 
Education 15.94 15.40 15.5 
Risk tolerance .307 .276 .281 
Incorne 80,509.9 74,267.0 75,406.4 
frorn linancial assets (% of incorne) 8.42 3.92 4.72 
Rouse value 145,366.58 147,540.14 147,143.4 
Outstanding debt 87,391.9 80,728.7 81,944.82 
Tirne in current job 10.6 11.48 11.32 
Constrained 26.0 74.0 27.23 
Age 40.08 41.07 40.95 
Farnily size 3.34 3.41 3.38 
Education 16.5 14.5 15.2 
Risk tolerance .306 .293 .296 
Incorne 58,113.45 67,195.22 60,276.3 
frorn linancial assets (% of incorne) 4.44 3.27 3.67 
Rouse value 120,896.06 106,595.57 110,232 
Out standing debt 82,737.8 67,195.2 71,131.34 
Tirne in current job 9.16 9.5 9.41 
NOTES: Data definitions and sources for all variables are reported in the Appendix. Ali dollar amounts 
are 1996 dollars. Only 352 households earn revenues from financial assets. 
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switch to a job that is "equally good" except for income prospects. Answers to the latter questions 
were in turn converted into a single, quantitative index of risk tolerance - the reciprocal of relative 
risk aversion, Le., 1/1/ - by Barsky, Juster, Kimball and Shapiro (1997). The resulting estimates 
appear in the 1996 Supplemental PSID data under the labels RT and RTl (see Appendix A.3 for 
details). We rely on this variable to proxy risk aversion. 
From Table 6, borrowers with ARM contracts have higher risk tolerance, irrespective of their 
credit status. It is important to stress that other proxies for risk aversion based on households' 
reported characteristics -such as presence of children in the household- may capture effects that 
have little to do with aversion to risk. Therefore, difficulties in pinning down the effect of risk aversion 
can be circumvented by drawing upon a self-reported indicator of the behavior towards a particular 
risk. However, even this measure has sorne caveats : there is no guaranty that people's responses 
to income-risk situations translate into similar behavior towards interest-rate risk. It should also be 
pointed out that this measure limits the sam pIe to households in the labor force. 
FinaIly, we con si der household income growth. In this respect we showed that : for households 
with similar wealth, those with a faster income growth are more likely to choose FRM loans because a 
higher share of their discounted lifetime income is then subject to uncertainty. Our proxy for income 
growth is education. In fact, vast literature in labor economics has established that higher schooling 
signaIs higher future earnings. 
We need to control for borrower's age, family size, geographic region, race, sex, as weIl as 
insurance program because all these variable are indirect screening variables at different stages of 
the mortgage application and thus influence the mortgage choice. We also control for borrower's 
mobility. In Table 7, we break up mortgage choice in terms of borrower's likelihood to move. People 
were asked to answer the question "Do you think you might move in the next couple of years?" A 
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TAB. 2.7 Mortgage selection and sociodernographic characteristics, by rnobility status 
ARM FRM ARM+FRM 
Variables 
Will not move 20 80 77.0 
Age 42.82 42.46 42.54 
Farnily size 3.22 3.26 3.25 
Education 16.64 15.30 15.57 
Risk tolerance .288 .271 .275 
Incorne 68,718.2 68,074.4 68,203.2 
frorn financial assets (% of incorne) 8.61 3.97 4.78 
House value 126,833.5 130,280.0 129,590.8 
Outstanding debt 78363.5 76,360.2 76,760.8 
Tirne in current job 10.14 11.30 11.07 
Will move (deftnitely, probably or uncertain) 21.6 78.4 23 
Age 39.97 40.57 40.47 
Farnily size 3.11 3.15 3.14 
Education 14.61 14.73 14.7 
Risk tolerance .359 .309 .321 
Incorne 85,118.4 81,038.4 81,919.8 
frorn financial assets (% of incorne) 5.23 3.47 3.92 
House value 167,921.3 160,772.7 162,317.0 
Outstanding debt 108,748.8 80,534.54 86,629.4 
Tirne in current job 9.95 9.89 9.9 
amounts are 
1996 dollars. 
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proportion of 23% did not exclude the ide a of moving; they are younger, have less time in their 
current job, a smaller family, than those who planned not to move. What stands out is that they 
are less educated, have higher earnings, higher valued housing and are more risk tolerant. Among 
more mobile borrowers, 21.6% chose adjustable-rate loans, which is more than their counterparts. 
2.5 Empirical methodology 
According to our theoretical model, a household's choice of mort gage is a function of its initial 
net-worth, its degree of aversion to risk and its income growth. A more complete model would 
include controls for life cycle factors, contracts mechanics, and credit markets environment as weIl. 
The problem of the utility-maximizing household selecting either an ARM or an FRM is esti-
mated with a binomial pro bit given by : 
(2.1) 
where n; is an unobservable index indicating the propensity to choose an ARM over an FRM loan 
for household j ; LC equals 1 if the borrower is liquidity constrained (i.e., had low initial net worth) 
and zero otherwise; RA denotes the inverse of the risk tolerance; ED is education; Tf and Tj 
are the contract rates on the FRM and the ARM, respectively; Tb is a benchmark interest-rate to 
control for the level of mort gage cost (see Appendix 2.2 for a description of Tb) ; Cj denotes a vector 
of control variables described above that are meant to capture other determinants of the mort gage 
choice; f3s and, are coefficient vectors (the expected signs are f31 > 0, f3r < 0, f31 < 0, and, > 0) ; 
and Ej is a standard normal error term. The observable variable is nj which takes the value 1 if 
n; > 0, i.e. household j chooses an ARM contract, and zero otherwise. 
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The interest-rate differential between FRM and ARM in Eq.(l) is unknown. For household k, for 
instance, which answered ''fixed'' to the question "Is the interest rate on that loan fixed or variable 
(adjustable) ?", only the interest-rate of the selected contract (i.e. rD is reported in the 1996 PSID; 
while the interest-rate rk of the rejected ARM contract is unobservable. Following Brueckner and 
Follain (1988), we predict rk from the ARM sub-sample. We proceed in the same manner for rejected 
FRM rates. OLS estimation would pro duce inconsistent coefficients because the sub-samples that we 
use to estimate interest-rate comprise only borrowers who find those rates attractive. To address this 
issue, we ran the Heckman selection procedure, with the decision whether to choose ARM or FRM 
instruments given by Eq.(l). More specifically, we first regress the interest over set of explanatory 
variables X on the sub-sample of ARM, and FRM, respectively. 
(2.2) 
where Vi is the error term, j = a, f. Then, the inverse Mills ratios are added as explanatory variables 
in the ARM and FRM rate equations. Finally, we estimate the following equation : 
(l') 
where ff and fj are the predicted FRM and ARM loans rate, respectively. 
2.6 Empirical results 
In this section, we present and comment on the results of several regressions. Columns 1-6 
of Table 8 report the estimation of different variants of Eq.(l'); we included controls in every 
regressions unless we did not report all of them. In Column 2, we show the baseline regression with 
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the correction for the selectivity bias. The comparison with Column 1, which does not correct for 
the bias, shows that changes are fairly small. 
Not surprisingly, the prices of mortgage loans influence the demand for mortgage, that is, the 
more expensive FRMs are relative to ARMs, the more likely borrowers will choose ARMs. In Column 
2, the FRM-ARM differential appears strongly significant as a determinant of the mort gage choice. 
One can also interpret the rate differential as a measure of expectations over future rates. In this 
respect, the higher the probability to choose an ARM contracts, the higher is the expected increase 
in the interest-rate for any general level of mort gage rates. 
The proxy for the wealth level is also strongly significant with a t-statistic equal to 3. But, 
contrary to our predictions the probability to choose an ARM loan is higher for less liquid borrowers. 
To verify whether this effect plays through the degree of riskiness of the mort gage contracts, we 
interact the dummy for liquidity-constraint with the interest-rate differential (see Column 5). The 
interaction term is not significant, which suggests that the wealth level plays through another 
channel. In this respect, the positive coefficient on Le is in line with Sa-Adu and Sirmans (1995) 
findings that mortgage affordability has a positive influence on the choice of ARM loans. The 
underlining assumption is that ARM loans are "cheaper". This finding is robust to the introduction 
of controls for the period of origination, the borrower's income or the ratio of mort gage payment to 
Income. 
We also control for government programs that facilitate access to homeownership for sorne 
categories of the population. The coefficient for the dummy of government insured loans is significant 
and negative. As it turns out, the propensity to select an ARM loan increases for homeowners 
that reject government insurance programs. This finding is true despite the fact that government 
programs are available irrespective of the type of instruments selected. It is a litt le puzzling since 
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TAB. 2.8 - PROBIT ESTIMATES OF THE MORTGAGE CHOICE 
SELECTIVITY CORRECTION NO YES 
Original 95-96 FHA/VA 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Constant -0.60 -0.57 -0.92 -0.57 -0.58 -0.58 -52.18 
(-1.85) (-1.48) (-2.53) (-1.35 ) (-1.81) (-1.79) (-0.96) 
Proxy for wealth leve! (LC) 0.26 0.25 0.34 0.26 0.30 0.26 0.214 
(3.09) 2.76) (3.14) (2.77) (2.92) (2.99) (2.12) 
Risk aversion (RA) -0.03 -0.036 -0.04 -0.036 -0.03 -0.036 -0.036 
(-1.97) (-1.96) (-1.76) (-1.98) (-2.01) (-1.92) ( -1.95) 
Proxy for income growth (ED) -0.006 0.004 0.008 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.002 
(1.45) (0.97) (1.59) (0.93) (0.94) (0.98) (0.64) 
FRM-ARM rate differential (rf - ra) 0.368 0.43 0.27 0.377 0.41 0.37 0.570 
(3.55) (2.76) (2.12) (2.14) (3.54) (3.62) (2.46) 
Benchmark inter est-rate -0.023 -0.02 -0.17 -0.021 -0.022 -0.076 -0.005 
(-0.66) (-0.51) (-0.38) (-0.51) (-0.54) (-0.89) (-0.10) 
Dummy for momlity 0.04 0.044 -0.026 0.045 0.04 0.046 . 0.044 
(1.07) (1.03) (-0.48) (1.06) (1.04) (1.09) (1.06) 
Dummy for goverment insured -0.25 -0.25 -0.32 -0.26 -0.25 -0.248 
(-2.88) (-2.86) (-3.16) (-2.93) (-2.93) (-2.80) 
LCx(rf _ra) 
-0.10 
(-0.74) 
FHA -0.41 
(-2.45) 
VA -0.18 
(-1.77) 
Dummy recent issues 0.004 
(0.02) 
Yeargot 0.026 
(0.95) 
Age 0.0007 0.0004 0.007 0.0004 0.0003 0.0009 0.0007 
(0.16) (0.1) (1.23) (0.08) (0.07) (0.19) (0.15) 
Marital status 0.004 0.01 -0.008 0.018 0.020 0.024 0.026 
(0.09) (0.38) (-0.14) (0.38) (0.41) (0.51) (0.55) 
Sex -.020 -0.06 -0.067 -0.058 -0.053 -0.10 -0.072 
(0.13) (-Q.41) (-0.38) (-0.38) (-0.35) (-0.63) (-0.47) 
j 14 14 13 15 14 15 15 
X2 (j) 79.26 79.83 44.67 79.57 68.51 79.23 80.49 
Number of ob8ervations 1503 1503 906 1503 1503 1503 1503 
NOTES: The dependent variable takes the value 1 if the household chooses an ARM loan, zero otherwise. In a sam pIe 
of 1,792 households, estimates of the risk tolerance where available for 1,503 households. Those estimates are computed 
for households in labor force only. Ali regressions includes as demographics and regional controls. Data definition and 
sources for all variables are reported in the Appendix. t-statistics are in parenthesis. 
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people that used government programs are motivated by mortgage affordability without necessarily 
being liquidity-constrained according to the definition above. In Column 6, we break up the dummy 
for government insured into one dummy that takes the value 1 if the insurance is with the FHA, 
and zero otherwise, and one dummy that takes the value 1 if the insurance is with the VA, and zero 
otherwise. It still stands that the propensity to select an FRM loan is higher for households that 
select government insurance programs. 
The risk aversion measure has predictive power for mortgage choice with a t-statistic of -1.98, and 
the correct sign. The probability to choose an adjustable-rate mort gage decreases with the degree 
of risk aversion. This measure seems to capture attitude towards financial risks, at least for the sub-
sample of homeowners in the labor force. Although not reported, we did not have the same success 
with proxies such as the age of the young est child or the number of children in the household.ll 
We can give additional support for the relationship between households' attitude towards risk and 
their mortgage choice, by a re-interpretation of dummy of government insured loan. We speculate 
that the dummy of government insured loan proxy households have a need for "security". Thus, a 
positive sign on this coefficient means that the propensity to choose a fixed-rate mort gage is higher 
for households that need more security. 
The proxy for income growth turns out to be insignificant as a determinant of mortgage demand. 
This lack of explanatory power carries to demographic variables in general, and sex, age or marital 
status in particular. Other controls such as the dummy for mobility are not significant. We also 
estimate Eq.(l) on the sub-sample of original and recently originated mortgage loans, respectively. 
Both the degree of risk aversion and the level of wealth lose significance in recently originated 
loans. This is due to the fact that mortgage interest-rates are poorly estimated once we consider 
ll"Child" is defined as person under 18 years old. 
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only sub-samples. When we estimate FRM-ARM rate differentials on the appropriate sub-sample 
predictive powers of both RA an Le increase, the dummy for government insured programs stays 
insignificant. 
One issue with our analysis is the potential difference in timing between the mortgage selection 
and the explanatory variables. In Column 4 and Column 5, we control for the recently issued 
mortgage loans in the baseline regression (by a dummy that takes the value 1 if the mort gage 
was issued before after 1995, and 0 otherwise), and the year the loan were issued, respectively. In 
both cases, the control is not significant, while both the sign and the significance of the coefficients 
of the key variables are pretty much unchanged. However, we observe a rise in the coefficient of 
the interest-rate differential; it suggests that the weight of the rate differential in explaining the 
mortgage selection is even more important. In Column 3, we run Eq.(1) on the sub-sample of original 
loans for additional robustness check. The conclusion is the same. 
2.7 Conclusion 
In this paper, we follow Chapter 1 findings to identify the determinants of the mortgage choice. 
More specifically, using the 1996 PSID we try to find the role of mortgage interest-rates, borrowers' 
wealth level, degree of risk aversion and income growth in determining the mortgage choice. One 
important feature of the underlying theory is that choosing between an ARM loan and a FRM loan 
is no different than choosing between a risk-free and a risky asset. 
We found that : FRM-ARM rate differentials, borrowers' wealth level and degree of risk aversion 
are important determinants of the mortgage choice. As it turns out, affordability considerations play 
a key role in the mort gage choice, that is, less wealthy households are more likely to choose ARM 
loans. Except for the degree of risk aversion few demographics variables influence the choice between 
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an adjustable-rate rnortgage and a fixed-rate rnortgage. But sorne of these conclusions do not carry 
on for recently originated loans. Clearly, a theory of the rnortgage choice should include both liquidity 
constraints and the dynarnic feature of the rnortgage which allow borrowers to self-insure against 
the interest-rate risk. 
Chapitre 3 
On the Maturity Structure of Foreign 
Debt Contracts in Emerging Countries 
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3.1 Introduction 
Lengthening the maturity structure of external debt in emerging countries is a widespread policy 
recommendation. Usually, such a recommendation is aimed at preventing volatile capital, in search 
of highest returns,to flow to emerging economies (Tirole, 2002). As shown in different case studies, 
short-term capital flows exacerbate financial turmoil in debtor countries by forcing domestic firms 
to sell off illiquid assets, or local government and international organizations into expensive rescue 
packages (for instance, South Korea and Malaysia in 1997-98, as discussed by Krugman, 1998; and 
Aguiar and Gopinath, 2005); especially when the country is unable to roll-over large volumes of 
maturing debt. In fact, unlike other developing countries, emerging economies have relatively high 
shares of short-term external debt. For instance, between 1988-97, approximatively 27% of foreign 
debt in Asia/Pacific and 21% for Latin America were of maturity of one year or less, compared to 
17% for Europe. l With both Asia/Pacific and Latin America at the center of the debate on the 
maturity structure of foreign debt, after they suffer a severe crisis during the same period. So, the 
question is why do emerging countries borrow short-term? 
In a frictionless world, a debtor country that enters into a multi-period relationship with a 
foreign investor must be indifferent between signing a long-term contract or a succession of short-
term contracts covering the whole relationship. However, if it is unfeasible to sign contracts fully 
contingent on all states of the nature, then a long-term contract and a succession of short-term 
contracts are no longer equivalent. This restriction binds when the economy is subject to external 
shocks, as developing countries usually are. In this case, long-term and short-term contracts differ 
in the degree that they expose the debtor to those shocks. Since they do not accommodate for 
1 Data are from the Institute of International Finance, it includes debt owed to foreign banks and others. Our 
calculations are based on average using the composition of foreign debt by region in Rodrik and Velasco (1999). See 
also Dadush, Dasgupta and Ratha (2000). 
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contingencies, long-term contracts are risk-free for the debtor; hence the lender bears the risk. 
Whereas the sequential feature of short-term contracts induces the debtor to take into account all 
possible contingencies ; hence the debtor bears the risk in this case. In this paper, we investigate the 
idea that a motive for choosing short-term debt contract is to benefit from favorable contingencies, 
that is, better borrowing conditions in the future. 2 
We opt for a three-period model, where a small open economy must choose how to transfer 
resources over time, given the uncertainty over the future interest rate; and given available contract 
types: long-term and short-term. Long-term contracts provide more insurance, but preclude bor-
rowers from profiting from future interest rate decreases. Short term contracts, on the other hand, 
allow for this possibility, at the cost of less insurance. For a debtor, better borrowing conditions 
-than what a long-term contract ofIers- come with a low interest rate, through a positive income 
efIect. Hence, it benefits from interest rate volatility if the gains from low interest rate realizations 
outweigh the losses from high realizations. The net gain is not zero because the income efIect is 
asymmetric for a risk averse debtor. We model the maturity choice of debt as a trade-ofI between 
those contractual options. The purpose of this paper is to understand the reasons that lead a debtor 
country to prefer one form of contract over another. 
The model has three implications. First, a country's short-term indebtedness varies negatively 
with the interest rate volatility. As the gain from volatility decreases with its magnitude, so does 
the willingness to choose the short-term debt. Second, a country's short-term indebtedness varies 
negatively with its growth. Among two countries with difIerent growth rates, the country with the 
lower rate faces relatively less uncertainty, because it has less resources concentrated in the future. 
Hence, for a given level of volatility, this country is more willing to choose the short-term debt. Third, 
2Myers (1977) pioneered the distinction between long-term and short-term debt as one of adjustability to contin-
gencies when it is too costly to sign contracts fully contingent on ail states of the nature. 
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the effect of growth on short-term indebtedness is exacerbated by the interest rate volatility. That 
is,high volatility increases uncertainty over future resources; hence makes countries less willing to 
choose the short-term debt. We test these findings on a panel of 31 emerging countries over the period 
1988 to 1998. We find that the effect of growth on the maturity choice plays through volatility; and 
despite the fact that the independent effects of volatility and growth are not confirmed by the data. 
The literature on international capital flows considers the question: why do emerging countries 
borrow short-term despite its associate risk ? Roughly, the leading answer is that investors' concerns 
explain emerging economies' short-term indebtedness (Tirole, 2002).3 Since emerging markets are 
perceived as risky, foreign investors select early-maturing contracts when they lend to emerging 
countries : either to monitor debtors' actions when cornes refinancing time, because opportunistic 
governments are tempted not to implement sound reforms (Jeanne, 2003; and Rodrik and Velasco, 
1999); or to quickly recover the proceeds of invested-funds, by charging a high risk premium on 
long-term debt (Broner, Lorenzoni and Schmukler, 2005). In this paper, we look at borrowers' 
willingness instead. That country-specific factors (e.g. borrowers' willingness, or policies) may have 
been important is suggested by the fact that investors' concerns alone cannot explain the maturity 
composition of capital inflows during periods of lending booms for instance. In fact, lending booms 
are period of enthusiasm towards emerging economies, characterized by a wave of private capital 
inflows with no apparent restrictions on their maturity composition (see Gourinchas, Valdès and 
Landerretche, 1999). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the environment. Section 3 carries 
out sorne preliminary analysis. In section 4, we study the link between the maturity choice and the 
interest rate risk. In section 5, we consider how economic growth affects the maturity structure. In 
3Following the "original sin" view, emerging market countries are obliged to borrow short-term, and in foreign 
currency because of their linancial fragility and sovereign risk (Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999). 
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section 6, we conduct an empirical investigation of the model implications. Conclusions and policy 
recommendations are presented in section 7. 
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3.2 A simple contracting game 
3.2.1 The setup 
We consider a small open economy in a one-good world, where the good is non-storable. The 
economy is inhabited by a representative consumer, referred to as the debtor country. The country 
can only borrow or lend through foreign investors, since they have access to the international capital 
market. Agents live for three periods, t = 1,2,3. 
Debtor country 
At each periodt it is endowed with Yi units of the good, where Yi > 0 and deterministic. The 
country ranks consumption streams according to : 
3 EL (3t-1 10g (Ct) , 0<(3<1, 
t=l 
where Ct represents period-t consumption, (3 is the discount factor and E is the expectation operator 
condition al on information available before any trade takes place. 
Foreign investors 
Foreign investors are risk-neutral, and offer the country a means to transfer resources over time, 
through contracts. Competition among investors ensures that terms on which these contracts are 
offered maximize the country's expected utility, while providing zero-profit in equilibrium. Moreover, 
foreign investors have "deep pockets." 
International capital market 
Interest rates are detennined in world markets. Denote Rt the (gross) interest rate between periods 
t and t + 1 (with t = 1,2), and R is the two-period interest rate between periods 1 and 3. The future 
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interest rate is subject to random disturbances; hence from period 1 standpoint, R2 is risky. We 
assume that R2 = R2 + f, where f is a random variable with zero mean and finite variance 0'2, and 
R2 is the expected value of the future interest rate. 
3.2.2 Contracting options 
A short-term contract is a pair (Dt, Dt+!), where Dt represents the net transfer from the contrac-
ting partner to the country in period t. A long-term contmct is a triplet (Dl, D2' D3 ). 
We assume that long-term contracts, fully contingent to the realization of the interest rate shock, 
are unfeasible. The lack of a third party (supranational) to settle disputes over contractual matters, 
is characteristic of internationallending to emerging countries. We assume that this limitation makes 
it impossible to sign contingent contracts ex-ante.4 In addition, contracts that start in period 2 are 
signed after the market draws the interest rate R2. Finally, all parties can fully commit to transfer 
part of future endowments, and only borrowing-Iending schemes are considered. 
On account of the latter assumptions, the country can reach an agreement with a foreign investor 
in two ways: (1) by signing one long-term contract at the beginning of period 1 ; or (2) by signing two 
short-term contracts, at the beginning of period 1 and period 2, successively. The main difference 
between the two agreements lies in the following : if the country foregoes signing a long-term 
contract, then it has the option to sign another contract, namely short-term, after the shock is 
realized. However, the country must decide from the beginning, once-and-for-all, whether or not to 
exercise this option. We summarize the two options in Figure 1. 
Short-term agreement 
the fact that whether the relevant contingency occurs or not is observed by (and is common knowledge 
among) the contracting parties. 
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,1111.11111111. 
period 1 period 2 period 3 
(O~,O~,O~) 
Long-term contract t-I ---------~-------___\I 
(01,02) (D' D') Short-term contracts 1------1======::::::!1~ ___ .:2'___=3_1 1 
FIG. 3.1 - Timing of the events 
The optimal short-term agreement is the solution to the following maximization problem : 
S.t. 
where for each R2 
S.t. 
Problem pST mimics the sequential structure of a short-term agreement (see Figure 1), with V 
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representing the continuation utility from signing a short-term contract at the beginning of period 
2.5 Each period, the debtor consumes its endowment plus all the transfers received during the 
ongoing period. For instance, in period 2 the country consumes its endowment Y2 plus the net sum 
of last and first transfers it had agreed upon in the first and second short-term contracts, respectively 
(i.e D2 and D~). Throughout the agreement, the (counterpart) foreign investor faces a zero-profit 
condition in each short-term contract. Finally, the expectation operator materializes the fact that 
the second short-term contract is signed after the market draws the interest rate; while the decision 
to exercise the option is made before this draw is known to the parties (see Figure 1). 
Long-term agreement 
The optimal long-term agreement is the solution to the following maximization problem : 
W LT == max {log(YI + Df) + f3log(Y2 + Df) + f32 Iog(Y3 + Dr)} Df,Df,Dfl 
s.t. L Df Dr Dl + RI +R =0. 
Only one zero-profit constraint must be satisfied throughout a long-term agreement, since it com-
prised of just one (long-term) contract. 
The country will choose the short-term agreement over the long-term agreement if its lifetime 
utility, when it can adjust to the interest rate shock, is greater than or equal to its lifetime utility 
when it cannot, i.e., W ST > W LT. Alternatively, the country will choose the long-term agreement 
5This overlapping structure of short-term contracts also appears in Rey and Salanié (1990). Rey and Salanié (1990) 
are concerned with conditions under which multi-period contracts are equivalent to sequences of short-term contracts. 
They identify three conditions: no private information, surjectivity and conflicting objectives. The comparison is not 
straightforward in our set up because we assume away fully contingent contracts. However if we allow fully contingent 
contracts, the condition most likely to be violated is the surjectivity because the debtor country cannot borrow or lend 
outside of the relationship with the foreign investor (its only outside option is autarky). For more on this literature 
see Townsend, 1982; Malcomson and Spinnewyn, 1988; and Fudenberg, Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1990. 
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if W ST < W LT . When W ST = W LT , the country is indifferent between the two agreements. 
3.3 Preliminary analysis 
In this section, we aim at clarifying what makes an agreement to be preferred to the other. We 
start by rewriting the long-term problem pLT in a way that facilitates comparison with pST. 
3.3.1 Rewriting the long-term problem 
Let us assume that the term structure of interest rates is such that R = RIR2' This assumption 
guarantees that investors will be indifferent between either agreement type.6 Thus, we can rewrite 
problem pLT as follows : 
where 
S.t. 
max {log(Y2 + D2 + D~) + (31og(Y3 + D;)} 
D~,D3 
S.t. 
At the optimum, we go from pLTI to pLT by taking Df = Dl, Dr = D2 + D~ and Df = D~. 
The virtue of working with pLTI instead of pLT is to make the long-term agreement resemble the 
problem of signing a sequence of short-term contracts. In pLTI the last-period interest rate, i.e., 
R2 is known with certainty as though the second short-term contract were signed at the known are 
6It cou Id be derived from a general-equilibrium model (see Campbell, 1986). 
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R2 = R2. From now on, we consider problems pLTI and pST alone. 
3.3.2 Unfeasibility of contingent contracts 
Let us consider the situation when there is no uncertainty, i.e., the distribution of the future 
interest rate is degenerate. It follows that problem pST collapses to become pLTI, making the 
country indifferent between the two agreements. Basically, in this case contingent contracts would 
have played no role, just like in a frictionless world. 
In general, however, the assumption that contingent contracts are not feasible needs not be 
innocuous. For instance, consider the situation when signing a long-term agreement brings the same 
outcome as remained in autarky, i.e., RI = (3-1 and R = (3-2. Thus, any contingency R2' different 
than the mean R2' is a (intertemporal) trading opportunity because it also means that the market 
interest rate R2 is different than the discount factor. Therefore, having the option to adjust to 
ex post realizations of the interest rate is valuable for the country? In this case, the short-term 
agreement is always preferred to the long-term agreement because the latter is not contingent to 
interest rate changes.8 
3.3.3 Country's attitude toward interest rate volatility 
Notice that pST features the expected continuation utility, while pLTI features the continuation 
utility evaluated at the expected interest rate. Thus, the long-term agreement only accounts for the 
mean of the interest rate shock, while the short-term agreement accounts for the mean and variance 
7Notice that this result holds regardless of the country's degree of risk aversion, and the size of the risk. It has 
the same savior as Ruffin's (1974) "non-autarky theorem" of international trade theory, namely : under uncertainty 
on terms-of-trade, autarky is never optimal regardless of the prospect of world priees. 
Bit follows from the convexity ofthe maximum operator. A similar result appears in Drêze and Modigliani (1972), 
"Proposition 2.1 : A temporal uncertain prospect is never preferred to the timeless uncertain prospect described by 
the same mass or density function, no matter what the consumer's utility function may be." The difference here is 
that we assume additive utilities over time, but Ahsan (1977) showed that it is as restrictive as Drêze and Modigliani's 
assumption 3. 
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of the shock. Heuristically, a short-term agreement is like a long-term agreement plus interest rate 
risk, without risk both agreements are equivalent.9 
Denote \122 as the second derivative of V with respect to the interest rate. Thus, we expect the 
country's choice of agreement to vary according to its attitude toward interest rate volatility as 
measured by V22 . If V22 > 0, then it will choose the short-term agreement; if instead V22 < 0, then 
it will choose the long-term agreement. This intuition can be supported using Jensen's inequality. 
Assume V22 is negative over the interval of admissible interest rates and for any D 2 . From Jensen's 
inequality : 
(3.1) 
Multiplying both sides of the inequality by (3 and adding up log (YI - ~:) yields : 
This last inequality holds for any D2' therefore it must hold when taking the maximum operator 
on both sides : 
It follows that : 
if ,then 
The opposite can be shown when V22 > 0, i.e W LT < W ST . 
To summarize, knowing the curvature of the indirect utility with respect to R2 is a sufficient 
gIn a different environment "Long term debt is like short term debt plus rollover insu rance" (Caballero, 2000). 
74 
condition for characterizing the optimal choice of agreement. For this matter, V22 needs not keep 
the same sign over the set of interest rates; aU it requires is an unambiguous comparison between 
the expected indirect utility and the indirect utility at the expected interest rate (see (1)). From 
now on we will focus on the properties of V. 
3.4 Debt maturity choice and interest rate volatility 
In this section, we characterize the optimal choice of agreement with respect to the interest rate 
risk. 
Consider the continuation. problem solely. For a given D2 and R2' V is similar to the indirect 
utility of an agent who receives the income Y2 + D 2 today, Y3 tomorrow, and must decide how much 
to borrow given the interest rate R2' subject to its intertemporal budget constraint. We want to 
understand how changes in R2 affect the curvature of V. We derive the first-order and envelope 
conditions of the continuation problem : 
(3.2) 
and 
(3.3) 
Combining (2) and the zero-profit constraint, we obtain : 
D' _ Y3 - /3R2(Y2 + D2) 
2 - R2 (1 + /3) . (3.4) 
Denote R; as the interest rate such that the country does not obtain (or make) a transfer from a 
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foreign investor, that is D~ = 0; from (2) : 
(3.5) 
By construction, at the optimum, when R; is strictly lower than the interest rate R2' the country 
lends part of period 2's income in order to consume more last period, Le., D~ < 0. 10 Conversely, 
when R; > R2 the country borrows to consume more in period 2, i.e., D~ > O. 
Combining (3) and (4) to obtain an expression for V2 , and deriving it with respect to R2 (details 
of calculations appears in the Appendix A.1) we can now state Lemma 1. 
Lemma 1. The function V has the following properties : 
(i) There exists a unique Rt su ch that V2 (D2 ; Rt) = 0; 
(ii) There exists a unique R~ > 0 such that V22(D2; R~) = 0; 
(iii) When R2 is greater than R~, V(.,R2) is concave; and convex otherwise; 
(iv) R~ is greater than R;. 
Proof See Appendix A.2 
Lemma 1 implies that the indirect utility function will typically resemble the curve depicted in 
Figure 2. First, the indirect utility decreases when ~ is higher than the world interest rate and 
increases otherwise. Second, the indirect utility function is convex for interest rates lower than R~ 
and concave otherwise. 
Based on (3), an increase in the interest rate makes the country better-off as long as D~ < 0; 
and worse-off when D~ > O. That is, the income effect dictates the behavior of the indirect utility 
with respect to interest rate variations.!1 
IOWe are concerned only with interior solutions. 
Il The benefit of using a logarithrn utility function is that we do not need to look at the interplay between incorne 
and substitution effect, that is only the incorne effect rnatters (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995). 
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FIG. 3.2 - Effects of the interest rate on the indirect utility. 
It follows that a slower increase of the indirect utility for high interest rates portrays a weakening 
of the income effect. Indeed, as we move away from low values of R2 above R;, C3 is getting high 
relative to the autarkic consumption Y3 ; while more and more units of consumption C2 are foregone. 
So, the equilibrating marginal rate of substitution is increasing in order to equate R2. Therefore it 
is increasingly costly to fore go extra units of C2 ; a further increase in the interest rate will have a 
relatively small effect on welfare. That is, the welfare is still increasing but at a weaker rate, which 
is in fact a fall of the strength of the income effect. 
ln the light of Lemma 1, whether EV (D2; R2) 2: V (D2; R2) or not depends on where R; lies 
relative to the interest rate R2. We expect the country to accept the long-term agreement when the 
gap between the two rates is high. Otherwise, it will choose the short-term agreement when the gap 
is sufficiently low. 
Figures 3 and 4 give the intuition. Let the distribution offuture interest rates be {R2 ±€, 1/2}. 
C') 
'C 
o 
.t: 
8. 
c =y 
3 3 .-._._'-'-'-
FIG. 3.3 - Interest rate risk is welfare-enhancing 
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perlod 2 
In Figure 3, the tangency between the indifference curve and the budget constraint (the solid line) 
is represented for an interest rate R2 = ~. A higher interest rate R2 + c, necessarily leads to an 
upper indifference curve; as does a lower interest rate R2 - c. Both interest rate changes make the 
country better off because they create trading opportunities, i.e the income effect is high around 
autarky. Moreover, the higher c the higher those gains. That is what is happening in the convex 
portion of the indirect utility function (i.e when the gap between ~ and R2 is low), and that should 
lead the country to prefer the short-term agreement over the long-term one. 
In Figure 4, the tangency occurs away from autarky. In this configuration, if the country is 
presented wit,h such an interest rate R2' then it will save part of period 2 income. Therefore, a 
higher interest rate R2 + c makes him better off, because it creates more trading opportunities. On 
the contrary, it will be worse off at the interest rate R2 -c. The gain from a higher interest rate does 
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FIG. 3.4 - Interest rate risk is not welfare-enhancing 
not necessarily outweigh the loss from a lower interest rate; as the income effect is getting weaker 
it is more likely to be a net loss. Moreover, the higher é the higher that net loss. Renee, leading the 
A 
country to prefer the long-term agreement over the short-term one, when the gap between R2 and 
R2 is high. We summarize our findings as follow, 
Proposition 1. A country is more likely to choose the short-term agreement: 
(i) the lower the interest rote offered by the long-term agreement,i.e., R (for a given level of risk); 
(ii) the higher the risk, when R is low; 
- the lower the risk, when R is high. 
Specifie to the country is the implicit R;, which from (5) is a complex combination of its discount 
factor (3 and its income profile. We will now turn to how the income profile determine the maturity 
choice. 
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3.5 Debt maturity choice and economlC growth 
In this section, we study the effect of growth on the choice of debt maturity. More specifically, let 
us define 9 such that 9 = Y3 /Y2 > 1; we are interested in how an increase in 9 affects the difference 
W LT _ W ST . We consider non-stochastic growth. 
3.5.1 The effect of growth : intuition 
All the intuition over the effect of growth can be gleaned using Figure 5. In this configuration, 
the last period income is high enough so that the country consumes more than its period 2 income. 
As Y3 increases, everything else being equal, the tangency between the budget constraint and the 
indifferent curve occurs in flatter portions of the indifference curve. That is, the income effect 
becomes weak. 80 basically, a high period 3 income makes the autarcic interest rate so high that at 
the extreme the debtor always ends up in the concave portion of the indirect utility function. That 
is, the more resources that cornes in the future, the higher the share of lifetime income subject to risk 
hence the higher the risk overall. To summarize, growth worsens the existing effect of uncertainty 
away from the autarcic point. 
3.5.2 The effect of growth : analytic 
It is useful to distinguish two channels when thinking about growth in the model. Denoted w 
the lifetime income where w = YI + RY2 + Y3_ ; and without loss of generality assume RI = {3-I. 
I RIR2 
Higher 9 means more resources throughout the lifetime, i.e., higher w (first channel). It also has the 
effect of tilting the income profile (second channel). In what follows we derive how growth impacts 
both agreements through these two channels. 
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FIG. 3.5 - Interest rate risk is not welfare-enhancing for fast-growth 
We compute the optimal consumption stream derived from the long-term agreement: 
ctt [1 + pt1 + P)] w (3.6) 
C lt -2 [(1 +1 P)p] (w cit) (3.7) 
c;t [1 !2 p] (w - Cft) (3.8) 
From (6)-(8), it follows that tixed shares of lifetime income are allocated to consumption in each 
period, and those shares do not depend on the parameter g. Thus, faster-growth affects the long-term 
agreement only by raising the lifetime income (first channel). Or say differently, two countries with 
different gs and similar lifetime incomes will have the same utility within the long-term agreement. 
The effect of growth in presence of uncertainty is hard to derive analytically for a non specified 
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distribution. We can, however, recover the intuition of the previous section using an approximation 
to obtain closed-forms solutions of the consumption stream. We derive the analogue of (6) within 
the short-term agreement, by using a second-order Taylor expansion of the first-order equation on 
Cl around optimal "long-term" values, 
cst [ 1 ] 
1 = 1 + ,8 (1 + ,8) 4> (g, 0-2) W (3.9) 
where 4> (g, 0-2) 1 + l'>g20-2, and 1'> > 0 is a constant. l2 Both c~t and c~t keep the same form as in 
(7) and (8) respectively, with Cl given by (9) and R2 replaeed by R2. 
Not surprisingly uncertainty affects the consumption profile within the short-term agreement. 
Sinee 4>(.,.) 2: 1, the country consumes less in the first-period within the short-term agreement than 
within the long-term agreement, Le., Cr ::; cft. Uncertainty on the present value of Ys creates an 
extra motive for saving, namely precautionary saving. The higher the risk, the higher the saving, Le., 
4>0' > 0; without risk 4>(g, 0) 1 there is no precautionary saving. Second, a change in w (everything 
else being equals, especially g) enters consumption streams in both agreements in the same manner. 
Renee, a shi ft in the lifetime income (first channel) does not affect the trade-off between agreements, 
that is 
Therefore, faster growth does not affect the maturity choice through an increase in the level of 
lifetime income. l3 
Finally, the slope of the income profile matters within the short-term agreement (second chan-
nel). More precisely, the higher the share of resourees that cornes in period 3, the higher the pre-
12We extend Blundell and Stocker's (1999) procedure to the case of interest rate risk, see Appendix A.3. Blundell 
and Stocker considered income risk (and log utility). 
13It follows from the homotheticity of logarithm utility function (see the Appendix A.4). 
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FIG. 3.6 - Debt maturity and growth 
cautionary saving, i.e., </>g > O. That is, 9 and a have the same effect on the short-term agreement. 
Therefore, 8WST /8a2 and 8WST /8g have the same sign, and 
8WST 
dg 8a2 
da2 = - 8WST < 0 
8g 
We summarize this section finding in the following proposition: 
Proposition 2. Consider two countries that differ only in terms of growth. The country with 
the lower growth is more likely to choose the short-term agreement. Moreover, countries choice 
of contracts are reinforced by the magnitude of the interest risk. 
We illustrate this result in Figure 6. Starting from a point where W LT = W ST , a higher risk 
(or growth) raises the likelihood that the country will choose the long-term agreement. 
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3.6 Empirical analysis 
From the analysis carried out in sections 4 and 5, the model has three implications. First, a 
country's short-term indebtedness varies negatively with the interest rate volatility. As· the gain 
from volatility decreases with its magnitude, so does the willingness to choose the short-term debt 
contract. Second, a country's short-term indebtedness varies negatively with its growth. Among 
two countries with different growth rates, the country with the lower rate faces relatively less 
uncertainty, because it has less resources concentrated in the future. Rence, for a given level of 
interest rate volatility, this country is more willing to choose the short-term debt contract. Third, 
the effect of growth on short-term indebtedness is magnified by the interest rate volatility. That is, 
high volatility increases the uncertainty over future resources ; hence makes countries less willing to 
choose the short-term debt. We test these implications across countries, given the level of wealth. 
The model is well-suited to describe emerging economies. In fact, because of underdeveloped 
domestic financial markets and a narrow economic base, developing countries are more vulnerable to 
external shocks than developed countries. Moreover, among developing countries the policy question 
of increasing the debt maturity structure is more acute for emerging economies, because they are 
most susceptible to tap foreign capital. 14 Our sample covers a panel of 31 emerging countries, as 
listed by the Institute of International Finance, from 1988 to 1998. Israel and South Korea are 
excluded because of missing observations for the total external debt. Except for the measure of 
short-term indebtedness, all variables come from the World Bank databases (World Development 
Indicators and Global Development Finance) and the IMF International Finance Statistics. The 
components of the measure of short-term indebtedness come from the BIS International Financial 
14Interest rates are not sufficient to determine investment fiows, country-specifie factors such as country default 
risk and credit worthiness are important as weil (albeit the high concentration of foreign investment in Latin America 
and East Asia relative to sub-Saharan Africa). 
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Statistics. 
The sample period belongs to a decade of capital surge to emerging countries (Gourinchas, Val-
dès and Landerretche, 1999). The relative attractiveness of placing funds in emerging countries, 
vis-à-vis developed countries, is at the heart of this wave of capital flows. Conceptually, the cor-
responding literature addresses this phenomenon by considering capital flows as influenced by push 
and by pull factors (Fernandez-Arias and Montiel, 1996). Pull factors are those that induce an 
improvement on the risk-return characteristics of assets issued by emerging countries, effectively 
pulling capital into the domestic economy. Domestic policies or creditor-friendly economic reforms 
are examples of pull factors. Push factors, on the other hand, operate by lowering the attractiveness 
of lending to developed economies, so as to push funds away from these economies. For instance, de-
terioration in the risk-return characteristics of assets issued in developed countries or the increasing 
role of institutional investors. Fernandez-Arias (1996) found that for the typical country -a country 
creditworthy enough to receive portfolio flows-, 86% of the surge in inflows of the 1990s, can be 
explained by movements in international interest rates (push factor), which in turn influences the 
creditworthiness of receiver countries. 
This period of lending booms ended with the financial cri sis of 1997-1998. At the onset of the 
crisis, international capital markets were more volatile for several reasons : political uncertainty, risk 
of depreciationjdevaluation and fire sale of foreign direct investments (Eichengreen, 2003). Thus, 
compared to 1988-1995, we expect the sub-period 1996-1998 to embed more volatility. To capture 
the market volatility (interest rate volatility in the model), we use a dummy variable that takes the 
value of zero for the years in the 1988-1995 sub-period and one otherwise. We estimate a pooled 
regression with thirty-one times ten observations. To control for country's wealth, as required by 
the model, we include the following regressors the financial depth (M2 over GDP), trade openness 
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(trade over GDP) and the ratio of indebtedness (total external debt/GDP). For a given country i, 
at time t, we measure short-term indebtedness as the ratio of short-term debt owed to foreign banks 
to the total external daims (STit ). 
The regressions in rows 1 to IV in Table 1 add real GDP growth at t + 1 (Crit+!), the volatility's 
dummy (VoltYt) or growth times the volatility's dummy (Crit+! * VoltYt), to the regressors cited 
above: 
where the {3jS are parameters, and Eit is an error term. Each regression also includes country dum-
mies, unless we do not report their coefficient. The t-statistics in regressions 1 and III have been 
estimated using robust standard errors, computed with the Huber-White methodology. Regression 1 
reveals a positive relation between short-term indebtedness and financial depth. That is, as financial 
markets deepen, the debt maturity structure shorten. The coefficient of debt to GDP is positive, and 
marginally significant. Unlike Rodrik and Velasco's (1999), the debt burden explains cross-country 
differences in short-term indebtedness. We find trade openness to be insignificant in determining 
short-term borrowing. The coefficient of real GDP growth is negative and precisely estimated, in 
line with the predictions: a 10 percent increase in growth reduces the share of short-term debt 
in total debt by almost twenty percentage points. Finally, the coefficient of volatility is marginally 
significant with the correct sign, and a quite high magnitude. As predicted by the model, market 
volatility and growth have negative effects on countries short-term indebtedness. 
The negative relationship between growth and short-term indebtedness is at odds with the com-
mon wisdom. In fact, one expects a country reliance on short-term debt to increase as it develops 
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TAB. 3.1 - Short-term external debt, growth and market volatilityG,b 
Dependent variable: Ratio of short-term debt to total debt 
Estimation M2 Trade Debt Growth Volatility Growth x Adj. R2 
method 
I.e (OLS) 2.004 -0.112 0.271 -1.931 -9.433 0.17 
(3.72) ( -0.35) (1.54) (-2.26) ( -1.48) 
n.à (IV) 2.24 -0.25 0.267 0.34 -6.676 0.13 
(5.05) ( -0.72) (1.52) (0.13) ( -0.37) 
III. (OLS) 1.929 -0.10 0.23 ..:..1.09 -3.8 -3.497 0.17 
(4.21) (-0.33) (1.66) ( -1.51) ( -0.45) (-2.65) 
IV. (IV) 2.205 -0.25 0.171 1.178 6.24 -5.052 0.13 
(4.52) (-0.72) (0.94) (0.41) (0.48) (-2.20) 
a. Ali regressions includes country dummies. Data definition and sources for all variables are reported in Appendix 3.5. 
b. t-statistics are in parenthesis. 
c. OLS regression are robust using the Huber-White methodology. 
d. The instrument for growth is lagged growth. 
(Dadush, Dasgupta and Ratha, 2000). Such prediction is not contradictory with our findings, be-
cause a good measure of development as considered by the common wisdom should be the financial 
depth (M2jGDP). So, what we show is that once we control for this efIect, it is no longer true that 
fast-growing economies have a larger share of short-term foreign debt. However, the coefficient may 
be biased if growth is positively correlated with the eITor term, especially if short-term borrowing 
today influences tomorrow's GDP growth. To take this potential bias into account, in row II we 
perform the same regression using the instrumental variables estimation; the instrument for growth 
is lagged growth. Our results do not stand as both growth and volatility loose all significance. Thus, 
suggesting that a country's short-term indebtedness determines its future growth. On these grounds, 
the model first two predictions are not robust to endogeneity bias. 
In rows III to IV, we test the third prediction of the model, namely that the efIect of growth on 
short-term bOITowing depends on the level of market volatility. We replace the volatility's dummy 
with the product of the latter and growth. Since, endogeneity is an issue we turn to regression IV. 
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Contrary to the model's prediction, growth now has a positive effect on countries' short-term indeb-
tedness. Recall that our setup is essentially a partial equilibrium framework (borrowers' willingness). 
The opposite effect than what we expected can arise from the supply side (investors' concerns). So 
that it can be due to an increase of investors' risk aversion as argued by Broner, Lorenzoni and 
Schmukler (2005). However, this coefficient is not significant. 
Finally, the coefficient of the interaction term is significant with the correct sign, regardless of 
the method of estimations. Hence, the data do not reject the prediction that the uncertainty over 
future resources, created by the market volatility explains emerging countries short-term borrowing. 
Countries with lower growth prospects end up having higher shares of short-term debt, everything 
else being equals. 
3.7 Conclusions and policy implications 
We have argued that there were important theoretical reasons why one would expect country-
specific factors' to influence the maturity structure of foreign debt to emerging countries. In this 
paper we have focused on the idea that emerging countries rely on short-term debt in order to 
benefit from better borrowing conditions in the future. We modellong-term and short-term debt as 
different instruments to deal with uncertainty over future shocks. We find that a country's short-term 
indebtedness varies negatively with the market volatility. Second, a country short-term indebtedness 
varies negatively with its growth. Third, the effect of growth on short-term indebtedness is magnified 
by the market volatility. 
The evidence reported in section 6 does not reject the effect of the interaction between country's 
growth and market volatility on the maturity composition of external debt. That is, emerging 
countries with lower growth prospects have, on average, higher shares of short-term debt in presence 
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of market volatility. However, we found little support for the independent effects of growth, or market 
volatility, specially once we control for endogeneity issues. 
The main feature of our setup is that short-term and long-term debt contracts are imperfect 
substitutes. Thus, any policy aiming at discouraging short-term indebtedness will also limit emerging 
economies' instruments to cope with external shocks. In this paper, we focused on cost to emerging 
countries, however, discouraging short-term indebtedness incur costs for foreign investors as weIl, 
and more generally for an "agents operating in a global environment" (see De la Torre and Schmukler, 
2004). Regarding emerging countries, our framework suggests that such policy must be accompanied 
with alternatives solutions to deal with uncertainty over future shocks. This paper open an aera for 
future research in this direction. 
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Conclusion 
Cette thèse contribue à la littérature sur la durée des contrats en identifiant les bénéfices et les 
coûts de l'engagement de long terme dans le cas des contrats de dette internationale, et dans le 
cas des contrats d'emprunt hypothécaire; notamment du point de vue d'un emprunteur. L'élément 
important de mon modèle est de ramener le choix entre un contrat de dette à court terme et un 
contrat de dette à long terme à un choix entre instrument sans risque et instrument risqué. Ainsi, 
le degré d'aversion de l'emprunteur, et son niveau de revenu déterminent sont besoin d'assurance 
et sa capacité d'auto assurance. 
Dans le chapitre 1, ce modèle de permet d'expliquer le recours aux contrats d'hypothèque à taux 
flexibles par des agents averses au risque. Ma contribution, à la littérature sur le choix de contrats 
d'hypothèque, est de montrer que les contrats d'hypothèque à taux variable permettent aux agents 
de s'auto assurer contre le risque de taux, en ajustant leurs paiements en conséquence. 
Dans le chapitre 2, j'estime une forme réduite du modèle de choix de contrats d'hypothèque, 
fondée sur les résultats du chapitre 1. Je compare les estimations aux résultats de la littérature 
empirique. J'ai recours aux des données de l'enquête des ménages du Panel Survey of Income 
Dynamic (PSID). Exceptionnellement, l'enquête conduite en 1996 indus des informations sur le 
type de contrats d'hypothèques que possèdent les propriétaires résidentielles. Elle inclut aussi un 
index qualitatif du degré d'aversion relative au risque des ménages. Mes estimations permettent 
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de conclure que le degré d'aversion au risque et le niveau de richesse du ménage sont des facteurs 
importants du choix de contrats d'hypothèque. 
Dans le chapitre 3, ce modèle de choix de la durée de contrat permet d'expliquer le recours 
excessif des pays émergents à la dette extérieure de court terme dans les années 1990. Ma contribu-
tion, à la littérature sur les mouvements de capitaux internationaux, est de montrer que la dette de 
long terme et la dette de court terme sont des substituts imparfaits. Aussi, toute politique visant 
la réduction de l'endettement à court terme devrait proposer des instruments alternatifs. 
Certains approfondissement sont néanmoins envisageables pour rendre le modèle plus réaliste. 
Une extension possible serait de considérer un profil de revenu stochastique, ou encore de considérer 
une économie de production. Dans le cas de la l'endettement international, par exemple, les chocs sur 
la productivité sont en partie responsables des besoins en capitaux étrangers. La degré de corrélation 
de ces chocs avec le taux d'intérêt mondial pourrait affecter mes conclusions sur le choix de contrats 
de dette. 
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.1 Chapter one 
.1.1 Sketch of the mortgage problem 
Consider a three-period mortgage describes as follows : the borrower receives cash Ïl to purchase 
the housing; in the subsequent periods, he makes interest-payment at rate rt, and prepayment of 
the principal Kt, out of his period-income Yi ; by the Jast-period he must have paid off the mortgage 
Joan. An optimal fixed-rate mort gage contract (FRM) is the solution tothe following maximization 
problem: 
subject to : 
C2 = Y2 - r2 (Ïl- KI) - K2 > 0 
C3 = Y3 - (1 + r3) (Ïl- KI - K2) > 0 
H- rIÏl- KI r2 (Ïl- KI) + K2 (1 + r3) (Ïl- KI K2) - + + + =0 1 +rl (1 +rt) (1 +r2) (1 + rI) (1 +r2) (1 +r3) 
In practice, interest-payments are computed with the compounded interest-rate rc such that 
(1 + r2)(1 + r3) (1 + rc)2. Here, period-payments are not necessarily equal because prepayment 
of the principal lS endogenous. 
Finally, denote H = Ïl Ro. With the following change of variables we obtain the FRM problem 
as in pp. 13 : 
Rj-l 1 + rj 
Dl = rlÏl + KI 
D2 r2(Ïl- KI) + K2 
D3 (1+r3)(Ïl-KI-K2) 
Hence the problem becomes : 
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.1.2 A value of information perspective of the ARM problem 
Consider the three-period problem introduced in the paper with the following twist in the 
information structure. U ncertai nt y on the future interest-rate is described by X possible realized 
1 
values of R2, indexed by x = 1, ... , X. Vector <P = ((PI, ... , 4JM) measures the probability of occurrence 
of these states of the world. Uncertainty on the future interest-rate is resolved in period 2, after 
payments D2 and D3 are decided. Prior to period 2, parties observe a signal indexed by m = 1, ... , M. 
Vector Q = (ql, ... , qM) denotes the vector of unconditional probabilities of the different signals. 
Observing the signal allows the decision maker to revise the probability distribution of the future 
interest-rate using the Bayes's rule. This relationship is characterized by the matrix of posterior 
probabilities P = [Pmx] with m = 1, ... , M and x = 1, ... , M. The decision problem is written 
Two polar cases of this problem are : 
(a) where m provides no information about x, so that m may be ignored completely since it 
doesn't enter the utility function; 
(b) and where m provides perfect information about x, so that x is essentially observed before 
peridd 2. 
W full == ~~U(YI - Dl) + fJt,4Jx [~rU(Y2 - D 2) + fJU(Y3 - R2 (RI (H - Dl) - D 2))] 
1 
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Basically, the ARM problem is similar to case (b), Le., W A == W full. These two cases feature 
different timing of the resolution of uncertainty on R2 : case (a) corresponds to a late resolution while 
case (b) is an early resolution. From the convexity of the maximum operator (see Marschak (1954), 
pp.61) it follows that W full > W no , irrespectiv~ of the utility function u. In words, the individual 
cannot be worse off with an early resolution of uncertainty provided that he can modify his decision 
from the information that he gets (Le., flexibility is valuable). Notice that, increasing risk is the 
same as increasing the informativeness of the signal in case (b); so, more information can 
increase the optimal exposure to risk. 
.1.3 Curvature of the indifference curve 
This section is based on Drèze and Modigliani (1972). Consider the general two-period utility 
index U (C2, C3) and the price ratio R2(= P2/P3). Let (C2, C3) be a point of tangency between an 
indifference curve U (C2, C3) = Ü and the budget line C2 + ~~ = Cte , so that the marginal rate of 
substitution of C2 for C3, i.e., M R SC2,c3 = - ~~~ lü = ~~ = R2· It follows that : 
(Ull ~Iü + U12) U2 - (U22 + U21 ~Iü) U1 
Ui 
(-Ull R21 + U12 ) U2 - (U22 - U21 R;-1) U2R2 
u.2 2 
-Ull + 2R2U12 - R~U22 
R2U2 
The numerator is positive, and is sim ply the opposite of the second-order condition of the above 
problem. It measures the curvature of the indifference loci at the optimal bundle (C2 , C3 ). 
In our framework, U1 = u' (C2), U2 = [Ju' (C3), Ull = u" (C2), U22 = [Ju" (C3) and U12 = 0 
(since utility is assumed additively separable in time), thus 
= 
U" (C2) + [J~u" (C3) 
R2[JU' (C3) 
/2 + Rn3 
/3 
.1.4 Sorne calculations 
1.1 The Euler equation of problem (lU) can be written as follows 
Total differentiation the Euler equation yields 
notice that D3 = -R2 (Y2 - C2 - (H - DdRt), hence 
dC2 {3u' (C3) - {3D3u" (C3) 
dR2 = u" (C2) + {3R~u/l (C3) 
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To obtain dC31dR2, take the total differentiation of the two-period budget constraint of problem 
(lU), that is 
Hence 
Let 'Yt = -u/l (Ct) lu' (Ct) denote the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. One can rewrite dC21dR2 
as follows 
dC2 {3u' (C3) (1 + D3'Y3) 
'(C) ( P2U/l(C3») 
-u 2 'Y2 - {3AV). U' (C2) 
Using Eq. (8), we replace u' (C2) by {3R2u' (C3) to obtain 
dC2 1 + D3'Y3 
dR2 R2 ('Y2 + R2'Y3) 
While, 
'(C) ( 2u/l (C3») 
-u 2 R2 'Y2 ,3R2 u' (C
2
) 
Using Eq. (8), we replace u' (C2) by ,3R2U' (C3) to obtain 
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dC3 R2 - D3/ 2 
dR2 R2 (/2 + R2/3) 
Let Vt = -Ctu" (Ct) lu' (Ct) denote the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and replace D3 by 
dC3 R2 - R2 (Rl (H - Dl) - Y2 + C2) /2 
dR2 R2 ("(2 + R2/ 3) 
1. 2 From the envelope theorem 
1 - V2 - (Rl (H - Dl) - Y2) /2 
/2 + R2/3 
Derive V2 with respect to its second argument 
Replace 8D3/8R2 by -8C3/8R2 = R2 8C2/8R2 + D3/R2 and we get 
V22 (Dl, R2) = (Ju" (C3) ( - ~:) :~: - (Ju' (C3) :~~ 
1.3 From the envelope theorem 
Derive Vl with respect to its second argument 
A further derivation of V12 with respect to R2 yields 
1.3' From the envelope theorem 
Derive Vl with respect to its second argument 
A further derivation of Vl2 with respect to R2 yields 
V122 (Dl, R2 ) = {3R I ~~2 u" (C2 ) + (3R I (:~~) 2 u1l1 (C2 ) 
1.4 Computing â2C3 / âR~ for a CRRA utility function 
sign. 
{ 
< 0 
>0 
when 1/2 < 1/ < 1, 
when 1/ > 1 
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provided that the borrower is not rich enough to pay off its loan within the first-two periods (which 
.1.5 Proof 
Lemma 1. Under Condition 1, âC3 /âR2 ~ 0 everywhere. 
Proof of Lemma 1. In Eq.(8), let us replace D3 by R2 (RI (H - Dl) - Y2 + C2 )) and rewrite it as 
âC3 1 - 1/2 - (RIH - RIZ - Y2) ,2 
âR2 ,2 + R2'Y3 
The term in parenthesis represents the lower bound of the outstanding loan balance at the end of 
period 2. Since 0 ~ Z < YI, Lemma 1 follows .• 
Lemma 2. A sufficient condition for first-period payment to increase with respect to risk is 
V122 ~ 0 uniformly. 
Proof of Lemma 2. Consider the function J such that : 
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with 
From Assumption 1, J(DI ) is concave in Dl; and rewriting Eq.(4) leads to JI(Dt) = O. Conse-
quently, D: ~ Dt if J'(D:) ;?; O. Noticing from Eq.(2) that 
In turn, D~ ~ Dt if 
where, from the envelope theorem, 
vI(D~ ,R2) = (3R1R2u' (Ya + R2D~(D~, R2)). 
Using Jensen's inequality (and following Rothschild and StigIitz (1970) and Hadar and Seo (1990)), 
this condition is met whenever Vl22 ;?; 0 over the interval of R2. Moreover, Eq.(9) can be rewritten 
âGI (3E(evI2(D1,R2)) 
â'r/ D 
so that V122 ;?; 0 also guarantees that âGdâ'r/ ~ 0 • 
. 1.6 Mortgage choice 
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TAB. 2 - Mortgage choice, housing value (H) and relative risk aversion (/1) 
v 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.5 
H 
3.95 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
3.8 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
3.65 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
3.5 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
3.35 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
3.2 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
3.05 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
2.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
2.75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
2.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Optimal choice : FRM = 1; ARM = o. 
.2 Chapter two 
.2.1 Data definitions and sources 
Housing 
Homeowner : a household who answered "Yes" to ER7035, and "Mortgage" to ER7036. ER7035 
asked "Do you have a mortgage on this property?", and ER7036 asked "Is that a mortgage, a land 
contract, a home equity loan, or what ?". 
Year got the mortgage (ER7052) 
Current interest-rate (ER7048+ER7049) 
Outstanding loan balance (ER7042) : the principal currently owed from all mortgages contracts on 
the home. 
Number of years remaining on the mortgage (ER7054) : the number of years left on the longest-term 
mortgage that the family unit has. 
Monthly mortgage payment (ER7044) : 
Whether the interest rate on the home mortgage were fixed or adjustable (ER7046) 
Whether hold a second-mortgage (ER7110) 
Annual property taxes (ER7033) : current annual property tax: liability. 
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Annual owner insumnce premium (ER7034) : annual dollar amount of homeowner's insurance pre-
miums. 
Whether mortgage payment include property taxes (ER7112) 
Whether mortgage payment include owner insurance premium (ER7113) 
House value (ER7032) : value of the home in whole dollars. 
Dummy for dwelling (ER7014) : takes value 1 if the dwelling is a one-family house, and 0 other 
wise. Type of the dwelling are one-family house, two-family house, an apartment, a mobile home, 
or other) 
Dummy for govemment insured (ER7038) : takes value 1 if insured by a government agency, and 
o otherwise. The main government agencies are the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), or the 
Veterans Administration (VA). 
Dummy for original (ER7040) : takes value 1 if originalloan and terms, and 0 otherwise. 
Demographies 
Marital status (ER7013 ) 
Bex of the head (ER7007) 
Dummy for mobility (ER7162) : takes the value 1 if the family unit will move (definitely, probably 
or uncertain), and 0 otherwise. 
Education (ER33315) : the actual grade of school completed; e.g., a value of 08 indicates that this 
individual completed the eighth grade by the time of the 1996 interview. A code value of 17 indicates 
that this individual has completed at least sorne postgraduate work. 
Dummy for liquidity-constrained (ER8841) : takes the value 1 if the head found himself unable to 
pay your bills when they were due, or obtained a loan to consolidate or pay off your debts, or had a 
credit or call or come to see you to demand payment, or had your wages attached or garni shed by a 
creditor, or had a lien filed against your property because you could not paya bill Had your home, 
car, or other property repossessed; and 0 otherwise. 
Family size (ER7005) : number of persons currently in the family unit. 
occupation (ER9108) : The 3-digit occupation code from 1970 Census of Population. 
Race (ER9060) 
Other 
Risk tolerance (RTl) 
Time in current job (ER) : 
Income (ER9244) : Total 1995 Family Money Income 
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Income from financial assets : sum of earnings from dividend (ER8335, ER8642), interest (ER8350, 
ER8657), trust fund (ER8365, ER8672) of head and wife. 
State of Residence (ER9247) . 
. 2.2 Benchmark interest-rate 
The data for the benchmark interest-rate come from historical summary data from the Finance 
Board's Monthly Survey of Rates and Terms on Convention al Single-Family Non-farm Mortgage 
Loans edited by the Federal Housing Finance Board (Table 15. Annual by State). This survey is 
the V.S. most comprehensive source of information on conventional mortgage rates and terms. The 
reported information is based on fully amortized mortgage loans used to purchase single-family 
non-farm homes. Loans used to refinance houses are excluded, as are non-amortized and balloon 
loans. The survey reports only conventional mortgages, and thus excludes mortgage loans insured 
by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) or guaranteed by the Veterans Administration (VA). 
We use the contract interest-rate (as opposed to the effective, the difference between the two 
rates cornes from initial fees and charges) 
We build an algorithm that assigns an interest rate to each borrower based on the state where 
he lives and the date of his mortgage origination. 
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.2.3 Estimating Risk Tolerance from the 1996 PSID by Ming-Ching Luoh and 
Frank Stafford 
In questions M1-M5 (page 138 on the paper mock-up of the questionnaire), employed respondents 
are asked how willing they are to take jobs with different income prospects. These questions are 
similar to ones used in the Health and Retirement Study, but here they indicate that the new job 
will be equally good, having the same non-monetary attributes as their current job. All answers to 
these questions offer a 50-50 chance to double income or to cut income in different proportions. 
If the respondent is willing to take a chance and answers yes, the next question branches into 
a query about their willingness to accept a doubling on the up side, combined with a cut to one 
half. If the respondent answers yes again, they are asked how willing they would be to accept a cut 
of 75 percent. If, however, the respondent answers no to the initial double or one-third option, the 
question branches into a query about their willingness to accept a 20 percent cut on the downside. 
If they answer no here, they are asked about their willingness to accept only a 10 percent cut on 
the downside. 
Based on responses to these questions, we can arrange people into six groups with an exact risk 
tolerance range, and four groups with larger ranges due to item non-response along sorne of the 
branches. 
To convert these answers into a single, quantitative index of risk tolerance (see Barsky, Juster, 
Kimball and Shapiro, Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1997), suppose the utility function is 
U(c) = (1/(1 - 1/q))C1- 1/ q . Our task is to estimate q. Assume that q is log-normally distributed, 
then X = ln(q) is a normal distribution. However, X is unobservable. What we observe is X*, which 
is in one of the ten groups according to the following pro cess : X* in group i, if Bi - 1 < x < Bi 
where Bi is the cutoff point on X determined by the design of the survey questions, indicated 
above. The likelihood function then is the product of each individual's probability of being in that 
particular group. We can estimate mean m and standard deviation Sx by maximizing the likelihood 
function. We can then recover q for each group by computing the expected eX conditional on being 
in that group. The estimated m is -1.27, while the estimated Sx = 1.579. The condition al means of 
q are as follows for each group. 
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A risk tolerance file is available which shows the difference between the risk tolerance estimates 
and the tolerances after measurement errors have been corrected. The first variable in the comparison 
file is the 1996 Family ID. The second variable, Risk Tolerance, is estimated from 1996 PSID 
questions Ml-MS without correcting for measurement error. In the third variable, Risk Tolerance 1, 
measurement errors are corrected based on both HRS waves l and II. Data for Risk Tolerance 1 are 
taken from the last column of Table 1 in Barsky, Juster, Kimball and Shapiro (Quarterly Journal of 
Economies, May 1997). Fields without numbers indicate that the head was not in the labor force, 
or that the question was unanswered . 
. 3 Chapter three 
.3.1 V's curvature 
We can compute V2 at the optimum, 
(10) 
Thus, we derive V:!2, 
Since by definition R2 > 0 and (Y2 + D2) + ~: > 0 (resource available for period 2 and 3), the 
denominator of V22 is strietly positive, thus 
.3.2 Proof 
Praof of Lemmà 1. (i) From (3), V2(D2;~) = 0 iff D~ = 0, which from (5) holds 
iff R; = !3(Y;}D2) ; thus (i) follows. 
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(ii) From (11) the sign of V22 is given by a second order polynom in fh The discriminant of the 
latter is ~ = 4yl(Y2 + D2)2 (1 + (3) which is always positive, so that there are two roots R;; 
and Ri. Moreover, we can easily show that R2 Ri = -,6(~!D2)2 < 0; it implies that the two 
roots have opposite signs. Denoted by R~ the positive root Ri, thus (ii) follows. 
(iii) Since the coefficient of R~ in polynom of (11) is negative, thus (iii) follows. 
1 (iv) Let compute R2 : 
thus (iv) follows. 
Lemma 1 follows. • 
R~ -2Y3 (Y2 + D2) - YI5. 
-2(3(Y2 + D2)2 
.3.3 Approximation of Cl in the short-term agreement 
Consider the continuation problem, when solving for Cl and C2 we obtain 
with 
- Y3 
W =W1 + R1 R 2 
and 
we can rewrite W ST as, 
First-order condition on Cl leads to : 
1 
Cl f3 (1 + /3) E [w ~ cJ 
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(12) 
We tuTU our focus to the function within the expectation operator in (12). Let make the following 
change of variables 
moreover let 
PLT 0 
Consider the second-or der Taylor expansion of the function r. fl around (fl LT , PLT) 
H+P 
1 
+PLT 
__ fl.=L=-T_"7<"2] (fl - fl LT ) + [ 
(flLT + PLT) 
fl LT ] ( 
----"2 P 
(flLT + PLT) 
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When taking the expectation, all terms vanish except the first and the last terms, thus 
where E (~) is obtained from an approximation 
After replacing cp (g, 0-2 ) in (12) we get 
.3.4 Partial derivative of W ST and W LT wrt to w 
Using the envelop theorem, we have that 
âWST 
âw 
the log utility function is homothetic therefore ~; ~. = 1 for j = 1,2,3, and 
J 
âWST 
âw 
1 +,6 (1 + ,6) 
w 
âWLT 
The result does not depend on E, thus the same computation carry on for a::;-. 
. 3.5 Data definitions and sources 
All variables are denoted in US dollars. 
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Short-term debt is defined along the remaining maturity criteria. That is, liabilities with an 
original maturity of one year or less, plus repayments due within the next 12 months on liabilities 
with an original maturity of over a year, plus arrears (both locational and consolidated). Source: 
BIS International Financial Statistics. 
Total external debt is the sum of public and private external obligations with original or exten-
ded maturity of a year or less. Source: World Development Indicators. 
M2; T'rade is the sum of exports and imports, Source: World Development Indicators. 
